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Abstract
The onslaught of neoliberal globalisation has transformed the role of trade unions in society as 
they, in collaboration with other civil society groups, take a leading role in issues affecting them 
at work as well as in society. Labour movements unlike other social movements easily assume 
the leading position as they have politically conscious structures in every part of the country and 
a high capacity for mobilisation across the country. Public sector strikes have recently hit the 
headlines in Zimbabwe and this study uses Communications and Allied Services Workers Union 
of Zimbabwe (CASWUZ) as a case study in view of the militant strike wave between 1994 and 
2004  which  were  stealthily  tied  to  democratic  reforms.  The  concept  of  social  movement 
unionism  (SMU)  was  explored  by  adopting  qualitative  research  approach  through  in  depth 
interviews and documentary analysis. The findings vindicate CASWUZ transformed into a social 
movement  union  as  the  union’s  demands  incorporated  wages  and  democracy.  CASWUZ 
managed to assume the leadership position among public sector unions by challenging the state’s 
policies that were not favourable to the working class and the poor through strike action during 
the  period  under  review  under  a  highly  politicised  work  environment.  There  is  evidence 
however, that the workers voice did not varnish in 2004 as the adoption of new sources of power 
such as symbolic power and logistical power can take back the union to its original position of 
fighting for decent work, social justice and a democratic society. 
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Chapter One
Introduction and Research Methodology
Introduction
It  is  argued  that  Trade  Unions  in  Zimbabwe  were  relatively  weak  and  divided  before 
independence.  During  the  pre  –  independence  era  they  arguably  posed  only  intermittent 
challenges to the status quo, such as in the General Strikes of 1948 when workers demanded not 
only economic improvements  but also social  and political  reforms (Gwisai,  2002). The 1948 
general strike was followed by others in 1964 and in 1979 which exhibited more or less the same 
characteristics. 
In post independent Zimbabwe, there was a wave of industrial action between 1980 and 1981. 
However,  this  did  not  last  as  the  new government  which  various  scholars  have  defined  as 
socialist  promulgated  a  raft  of  legislation  that  sought  simultaneously  to  curtail  as  well  as 
strengthen the labour movement (Gwisai, 2002; Saunders, 2005, Zeilig, 2002). This is supported 
by the fact that government had a personal interest of stable industrial relations when it formed 
the ZCTU (Sachikonye, 1987). Despite the fact that five trade unions had merged to form the 
African  Trade  Union Congress  (ATUC),  government  went  ahead to  give  a  directive  for  the 
formation  of  the  ZCTU  since  the  ATUC  was  anti-ZANU-PF.  On  a  positive  note,  the 
amalgamation strengthened the union movement  given that government  followed up in 1985 
with the pro-worker Labour Relations Act (Madhuku, 2001). The most prominent feature was 
the principle of one industry one union retained from the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act which 
worked in favour of strong trade unions. Strong trade union rights were also a way of thanking 
the workers’ support during the liberation struggle (Madhuku, 2001). However, the introduction 
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of ESAP in 1991 wiped away these labour rights as the labour market was deregulated. The 
major arguments were that the principle of one industry one union contravened ILO Conventions 
87 and 98 and also that it infringed on section 21 of the national constitution which guarantees 
the constitutional right of freedom of association (Madhuku, 2001).
The hardships caused by ESAP led to the opposition of government polices by the labour unions 
starting the early 1990s. Most prominently was the 1994 PTC workers’ strike which sparked 
more strikes in the public sector.  Repeated actions were witnessed in the second half  of the 
1990s. Although most of the strikes were industrial,  it  can be argued that most public sector 
strikes are inherently political as they are directed at the government. The notable contribution 
by public sector unions is testified by the fact that prominent figures from the public sector such 
as Gibson Sibanda and Gift Chimanikire were among the top five when an opposition party was 
incepted in 1999. Despite the fact that  Zimbabwe has captured global news for more than a 
decade now, much attention has been focused on the political and economic crisis as compared 
to the struggles of trade unions.
Aims of the study 
The aim of this study is to analyze the shifts in the strategies of the Communications and Allied 
Services Workers Union of Zimbabwe (CASWUZ) in the period 1994 – 2004 which was a time 
of high political volatility. Faced with a fast changing political landscape and ensuing challenges 
the labour movement was challenged to review its strategies. Existing in a harsh political and 
economic environment, the CASWUZ has attempted to remain relevant to the interests of the 
rank-and-file  members  by  adopting  varied  strategies  to  cope  with  the  rapidly  shifting  and 
unpredictable environment. It has arguably been the strongest and most militant affiliate of the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions as reflected in the fact that it led more strikes than any 
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other affiliates during this period. This study aims to analyze the reasons behind the union’s 
central role in the aforementioned strike wave. 
Bond and Manyanya (2002:87) have noted that “in 1994 industrial action was revived by postal 
and telecommunication workers…” Since then public sector workers have continued to play a 
leading role in the reinvigoration and politicization of union activities Moreover, CASWUZ’s 
participation in strikes and ‘stay-aways’ called by the ZCTU was overwhelmingly endorsed by 
the union’s rank-and-file membership. James Gondo (a long standing union leader in the post 
and telecommunications sector) argues that the workers and CASWUZ members supported these 
strikes because they assisted to fight a common enemy (the state) believed to be responsible for 
their suffering.1 Even non unionized workers within the communications industry participated in 
the strikes (Raftopoulos and Sachikonye, 2001: 279). 
This was a landmark shift in strategy by public sector unions in Zimbabwe which had enjoyed 
state alliance post 1980. Despite the union’s prominence in the struggles during the period under 
review its role has not been fully explored as most scholars give attention to the MDC, the ZCTU 
and the student intelligentsia (Kraus, 2007). Although CASWUZ had embarked on successful 
strikes before 1994, most notably in the 1980s and in 1992, the 1994 strike against low wages 
first raised them to prominence and consequently assumed a leadership position. Soon thereafter 
the  union  also  entrenched  its  leading  role  in  broader  industrial  and  political  struggles.  It  is 
therefore one of the aims of this study to analyze the role played by the CASWUZ in the fight for 
wages and democratic reforms in view of their overwhelming participation in general strikes and 
stay-aways. 
1 Interview: James Gondo, Johannesburg,  06 September 2009. He is  one of the founding members of ZPTWU 
(1971) and was midlands Provincial Chairman in 1971. He became one of the leading figures in CASWUZ in post 
colonial Zimbabwe before becoming a full time Education Officer in 1999 when he took a voluntary exit package 
from Zimbabwe Posts where he was working. 
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A key question considered here is whether the struggles waged by CASWUZ may be categorized 
as striking for wages and democracy? In other words, what was the relationship and balance 
struck between industrial and political struggles in overall the strategy of the union? Over the 
years, there has been some debate, especially in working class circles about whether the union’s 
involvement in the agitation against the war veterans’ levy, the hiking of sales tax, human rights 
abuses, police brutality,  pushing for the adoption of a new national constitution,  government 
corruption and general economic decay has changed its character.
Given the above, one cannot have a fair understanding of CASWUZ’s character without looking 
at its involvement in matters affecting them in society as well as at the workplace. This study 
therefore aims to analyze the union’s changing character.
The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991 by Zimbabwe 
subjected the country to the ideological prescriptions of the Breton Woods Institutions, including 
labour market liberalization, privatization/commercialization of state enterprises and downsizing, 
all of which negatively affected labour. The study discusses the links between strikes and the 
adoption of ESAP, which weakened labour’s demands for minimum standards (Madhuku, 2001).
CASWUZ represents workers in the public sector which places it in a very sensitive and strategic 
position  in  relation  to  the  state.  This  is  of  particular  significance  considering  that  from 
Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 the unions were pro government. However, in the post 1990 
era the voice of the trade unions became assertive in challenging government decisions. The 
study  will  analyze  how  this  shift  in  political  allegiance  affected  the  role  and  strategies  of 
CASWUZ. The study seeks to explore if these strategies were intended to benefit the rank-and-
file and how they perceived this. 
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Research Question: How did the CASWUZ’s role and strategies change during the strike wave 
between 1994 and 2004 in the context of political  upheavals and the implementation of neo-
liberal policies?
In answering the research question, the study will examine the following sub questions
1. How did the CASWUZ respond to the changes in the communications industry brought 
about by the implementation of the ESAP and other neo liberal policies?
2. What were the reasons behind the wave of strikes between 1994 and 2004?
3. Why did the CASWUZ play a leading role in the ZCTU’s decision to break its alliance 
with the ZANU-PF government and then in the decision to form the MDC?
Rationale
The  1994 strike  by  the  CASWUZ marked  the  beginning  of  a  new era  in  the  Zimbabwean 
industrial relations climate yet significant research on the causes and significance of these strikes 
is virtually non - existent. Central to this study is to find out the factors that made it possible for 
the CASWUZ to confront the employer more regularly on issues affecting them at the workplace 
and in society.
This  research  is  important  as  it  draws  attention  to  the  relationship  between  labour  and 
government  as the employer  between 1994 and 2004. Rather  than studying  all  the thirty-six 
affiliates of the ZCTU, this research focuses on CASWUZ because of its leading role of the 
unions’ views and position at the time. It is important to examine the causes of strikes in the 
communications industry as they marked the beginning of the nascent social movement unionism 
(SMU) in Zimbabwe. These strikes triggered other strikes in the airways, construction, banks, 
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and the health sectors which called for improved working conditions and, critically, covertly tied 
to  democratic  reforms.  On  ZCTU led  strikes  the  study seeks  to  expose  the  role  played  by 
CASWUZ and whether it was the central character.
In the period under study,  it  is the communication sector workers led by the CASWUZ that 
participated repeatedly in strikes and yet managed to emerge from this bruising confrontation 
with the state more or less intact, something that was rare with other ZCTU affiliates. The study 
will discuss the union’s strategies during this period and what made them effective.
Prior to 1994 the CASWUZ and the ZCTU had close ties with the ruling ZANU-PF party. This is 
clearly exposed by the fact that in disputes (some protracted) involving collective bargaining, the 
union  would  invariably  seek  guidance  from  the  parent  Ministry  of  Information  Posts  and 
Telecommunication  and  ZANU PF.  This  mostly  worked  to  the  benefit  of  the  union  as  the 
government would instruct managements to accede to the workers’ demands. The 1994 strike 
unlike that of 1992 in which the ministry managed to call off after five hours is critical because it 
marked a turning point in CASWUZ’s relationship with the ruling party as the ministry failed to 
get back the workers to work. The ZANU PF dominated parliament and cabinet had to intervene 
in 1994 and made a decision to award salaries for Communication sector workers. 
In contrast, the 2004 strike was widely condemned by the parent ministry and the ruling ZANU-
PF party as a political strike. This was because the CASWUZ as an affiliate of the ZCTU was 
then  considered  an  appendage  of  the  opposition  MDC  (Matombo  and  Sachikonye,  2010). 
CASWUZ had fallen out with the ZANU-PF led government because of its alliance with the 
opposition MDC and the CASWUZ President  Lovemore Matombo has recently asked Prime 
Minister  Morgan  Tsvangirai  to  intervene  since  the  workers  were  dismissed  for  allegedly 
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supporting  his  party  (http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk ).  Despite  the  striking  workers  having 
followed  the  necessary  procedures  of  going  on  industrial  action  in  terms  of  the  labour 
legislations, the employers made a unilateral decision to dismiss them. More than fifty percent of 
the  workers  who  did  not  return  to  work  as  per  the  employer’s  directive  were  unilaterally 
dismissed.  Although  the  union  leaders  approached  parliamentarians  for  the  reversal  of  the 
decision (CASWUZ, documents) the unionists were shocked to learn that a political decision had 
been taken to “discipline it”. Strikes would no longer to be tolerated in political circles. The 2004 
strike marked the end of the usually protracted and regular strikes in the communication sector. 
The study will consider the impact of this outcome on the character of the union.
The CASWUZ leadership played a prominent role in the formation of the MDC as evidenced by 
the fact that the union’s General Secretary (GS) became a leading member of the new party. This 
highlights  the  contentious  issue  of  the  relationship  between  unions  and  political  parties  as 
subsequent events revealed that the state did not tolerate trade union autonomy and involvement 
in opposition politics. This represents a shift from a union that was once pro government to one 
that had become autonomous and critical of the government. It is important to acknowledge that 
a trade union is a heterogeneous group consisting of people with differing political views. There 
are some elements within the union who may prefer economism / workerism while others might 
want  to  follow  social  movement  unionism.  Workerists  are  those  workers  who  believe  that 
workers should have nothing to do with things beyond bread and butter issues such as politics 
and democracy. 
Other trade unions could also learn from this study since it considers the relationship between 
employers and a trade union supporting an opposition party and the trajectory it follows. The 
study will explore the trajectory of a trade union supporting a ruling party and one supporting an 
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opposition party. This adds to a body of knowledge for future trade union decisions on tactics 
and strategies as they reflect on past events.
Currently there is no in-depth study on the causes of strikes led by the CASWUZ although these 
strikes have been mentioned in passing by some scholars like Bond and Manyanya (2002) and 
Raftopoulos and Sachikonye (2001). The CASWUZ strikes have however, enjoyed coverage in 
cyberspace  for  example  (http://wsws.org,  http://www.union-network.org/telecom,  new 
Zimbabwe.com, SABC, and  http://www.zimbabwesituation.com ). This study aims to fill  this 
gap by building on the thin literature that currently exists.
Methodology
This  section  discusses  the  methods  used in  the research.  The  study made use of  qualitative 
research  methods.  The  qualitative  research  methods,  selection  of  research  sites,  access  and 
ethical consideration, strength, weaknesses and problems in the field as well as limitations of the 
study are discussed below.
Selection of research sites
The study mainly focused on CASWUZ leadership from three provinces, mainly those residing 
in three of the major cities: Harare, Masvingo and Mutare. The initial intention was to cover 
western  province  (Bulawayo),  but  this  was  dropped  due  to  financial  constraints.  Purposive 
sampling was used to select the research sites as well as the respondents and in-depth interviews 
were carried out. According to Neuman (2000: 198) purposive sampling “uses the judgment of 
an expert in selecting cases or it selects cases with a specific purpose in mind.” It was necessary 
to use purposive sampling in order to select unique informants who in this case were informative 
(Neuman, 2000).
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Heterogeneity is one of the key factors that were considered when selecting the research sites. 
The three regions and provinces have unique varied characteristics which justified their selection 
in this study. The Eastern province (Mutare) had the most successful strikes as indicated by a 
very high level of militancy.  South province (Masvingo) and north province (Harare) on the 
other hand were reported to have a low and moderate level of militancy.
An attempt was made to be gender sensitive in selecting the interviewees. However, it proved to 
be difficult to find female shop stewards as the union is traditionally male dominated. One of the 
few female shop stewards from Masvingo who had initially agreed to participate in the research 
later declined citing time constraints. Nevertheless, the researcher still managed to interview four 
females out of the sixteen interviews conducted. The study managed to interview workers from 
different generations (between 33 and 59years). This helped the researcher to capture the varied 
experiences of the pre and post independence industrial relations. Only those leaders who were 
in employment during the period under review were interviewed because they offered firsthand 
experience of the period under review.
Semi-structured In-depth Interviews
The  primary  research  method  was  the  semi-structured  in-depth  interviews.  The  researcher 
managed to conduct sixteen in-depth interviews with trade unionists from different structures in 
the organization: shop stewards, provincial executive committee members and national executive 
council members. The President of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions who is also the 
President of CASWUZ was also interviewed.
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 The sixteen semi-structured in-depth interviews were as follows: four union national executive 
council  (NEC)  members,  four  provincial  executive  members,  and  eight  rank-and-file 
representatives (shop stewards). Most of the Harare interviews were conducted at the CASWUZ 
offices.  In Masvingo and Mutare the interviews were conducted at  the respondents’ working 
places. Only two interviews were carried out at the interviewees’ homes because this was more 
convenient for them. In doing research sometimes it’s important to be flexible and acquiesce to 
the needs of informants.
There was no restriction  on the way the interviews were conducted.  Rather  interviews were 
aimed at giving the interviewees an opportunity to articulate their experience from their own 
perspectives.  All  interviews were recorded with the consent  of  the  interviewees,  except  one 
interview where the respondent feared for her personal security should the recorder land in the 
hands  of  state  security  agents.  In  addition  to  recording  the  interviews  the  researcher  also 
compiled some notes. Comprehensive notes were taken for the one interviewee who declined to 
be recorded thereafter the researcher compiled a detailed report of the interview. 
The central  advantage  of  this  technique  (in  depth interviews)  lies  in  the  use of  open ended 
questions  which  permit  a  variety  of  responses  and  “can  use  extensive  probes”  (Neuman, 
2000:273).  This strategy gives informants  an opportunity  to  develop  their  answers outside a 
structured format. It also allows the researcher to discover unanticipated findings and it permits 
adequate answers to complex questions.
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However, this method has its own disadvantages. Different respondents give different degrees of 
detail in answers. Some responses were buried in details which were not always relevant to this 
study. The major disadvantage of in-depth interviews is that a greater amount of the respondents’ 
time, thought and effort is necessary and also it is costly. 
Qualitative Research Methods
The study primarily used qualitative research method for data gathering.  This is because the 
method offers the researcher some flexibility and facilitates the relationship of trust and thus can 
uncover in-depth information. The methods also focus upon the way participants interpret their 
experiences and construct reality.  As argued by Burgess 1984, the ultimate aim of qualitative 
research is to study situations from the participant’s point of view and search meaning (Burgess, 
1984: 3). The use of qualitative research methods helps to gain a rich and detailed description of 
the individual understanding of a group’s social worlds (Neuman, 2000). Lemmer (1992) argues 
that qualitative research methods assist the researcher to understand the life of individuals or 
groups  studied  in  their  own  frame  of  reference,  and  offer  an  opportunity  to  make  an 
interpretation  which  reflects  the  interviewee’s  account.  The  aim of  this  study is  to  gain  an 
intimate understanding of the beliefs, understanding, ideas and experiences of the shop stewards 
and the NEC members of CASWUZ and how these relate to the shifting strategies of the union. 
Interviews were used as the main research instrument, supplemented by documentary analysis. 
Also  qualitative  methods  were  supplemented  by  quantitative  methods  to  ascertain  the 
sociological characteristics of the respondents.
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Documentary Analysis
In order to gain a broader understanding of the changing strategies of CASWUZ in the strikes, 
this study also examined documentary sources. The study focused on documents accessed from 
the union archives in particular covering the 1990s to 2004. Access to these documents was not a 
problem as the researcher is an executive official of the union and had access to files containing 
strike notices, congress resolutions, reports, memoranda, collective bargaining agreements and 
minutes  of  meetings  with  management.  Only  documents  with  relevance  to  the  study  were 
analyzed. However, it proved difficult to access some documents from ZCTU.
According  to  Neuman  (1997)  in  historical  comparative  approach data  is  gathered  from four 
forms  of  archival  and  documentary  sources.  The  first  are  primary  sources  which  consist  of 
letters, diaries, newspapers, movies, and novels, articles of clothing, photos, and so forth of those 
who lived in the past and have survived into the present. Secondly,  secondary sources which 
consist  of  the writings  of  specialist  historians  who have  spent  some years  studying  primary 
sources. Third, there are running records, which include files on existing statistical documents 
maintained  by  organizations.  Last,  recollections,  which  consist  of  words  of  writings  of 
individuals about their past lives or experiences based on memory. This study limited itself to the 
use of primary sources, secondary sources, and recollections, and examined the following:
• Policy documents, minutes of union meetings, collective bargaining agreements (CBA), 
and
• Media coverage of CASWUZ’s role in strikes including ZCTU newsletters.
The disadvantage of documentary analysis is that it offers a static view of history and provides 
little sense of the process through which that document came into being. To counter this problem 
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the study analyzed documents in relation to the information gathered through semi structured in-
depth interviews. Most documents are characterized by silences which might even be difficult to 
discover. This is where in-depth interviews come in. By use of extensive probes, one can get 
sense of these informal activities (Neuman, 1997).
Access and Ethical Consideration
Participation in this study was on a voluntary basis and the participants were advised of their 
right to refuse to take part in the study or not to answer certain questions if they so wish (Babbie 
and Mouton, 2001). This research was guided by Burton’s (2000) argument that in any research 
co-operation must be voluntary and the respondents must be advised in advance that it is within 
their rights to refuse to answer certain questions or not to take part if they feel so. Some of the 
interviewees  were particularly  afraid  of  victimisation  by the  employer  (state)  despite  having 
volunteered to take part. The researcher guaranteed the protection of their identities through the 
use of pseudonyms. The researcher also gave assurance that all the information will be collected 
in  confidence  and used  for  scholarly  purpose only.  All  the  participants  were  briefed  on the 
rationale of the study and the procedures to be followed and the researcher volunteered to answer 
any queries regarding the study and any of the procedures to be used. Access to all the sites and 
persons was not a problem since the researcher had sought permission from the employers, the 
ZCTU  and  the  CASWUZ.  Some  of  the  stakeholders  acknowledged  the  importance  of  the 
research  to  the  communication  sector  and  the  labour  movement  and  assured  to  give  the 
researcher maximum support where possible.
Strengths, Weaknesses and Problems in the Field
The study acknowledges that  the different  research instruments  used in this  study had some 
limitations.  These include  silences  characteristic  of  documents  and also  bias  of  respondents. 
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However, the research instruments (documentary analysis and interviews) complemented each 
other thereby minimizing their respective weaknesses. Also, the fact that the researcher was a 
participant observer of most of the ZCTU and CASWUZ led strikes allowed the extension of the 
strengths of each instrument and limited the weaknesses. 
The literacy level of some of the interviewees was very low, and this proved to be a challenge for 
the study as some of the interviewees had a very limited command of the English language. The 
researcher’s proficiency in Shona proved to be very essential  and critical during some of the 
interviews. The research was conducted with a very limited budget and as a result the researcher 
faced some financial constraints. 
The  research  was  conducted  between  July  and  December  2009  with  an  initial  target  of  20 
interviews in Harare and Bulawayo. Time and financial limitations forced the researcher to select 
three  provinces  and  conduct  a  total  of  sixteen  interviews.  Despite  all  the  confidentiality 
assurance the polarization of relations between labour and state security became an issue as one 
of the respondents doubted the security guarantee despite a letter from the university indicating 
that this was an academic research. 
Limitations of the Study
Although  this  study makes  a  contribution  on  the  discourse  on  CASWUZ’s  and trade  union 
shifting strategies,  it  also has some limitations.  There are five provinces in which CASWUZ 
organizes  in  Zimbabwe and focusing on only three  provinces  limits  the  scope of  the study. 
However, the methodology used in the study ensures that a representative sample was selected. 
The researcher is one of the leading members of CASWUZ and as such, it is not always easy to 
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research one’s own organization. Mindful of this, the researcher maintained a critical position 
which then helped to come up with an objective report. Also, being an insider made it easy for 
the researcher to access critical union documents and officials.
Conclusion
The  chapter  highlighted  the  importance  of  unions  in  social  transformation.  In  doing  this, 
CASWUZ was taken as an example because of the leadership role it played during 1994 to 2004. 
The aims, rationale and research methodology were also touched on. The chapter ended with a 
discussion on the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of the study.
Chapter Two
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter highlights the literature pertaining to the role of trade unions in the fight for wages 
and for social justice. According to Peta et al (1993:9) “history teaches us that oppressed masses 
will mobilize and organize themselves into mass movements whether the law allows it or not.” 
The  chapter  argues  on  Social  Movement  Union  (SMU)  as  it  is  relates  to  CASWUZ.  This 
theoretical framework will help to ascertain the research findings as to whether the character of 
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CASWUZ meets the features of SMU or not. The rest of the chapter will review literature on 
strikes  and  the  quest  for  democracy  in  Africa  and  Zimbabwe  highlighting  on  CASWUZ’s 
shifting strategies.
Political Unionism or Social Movement Union (SMU)
Burawoy and Wolpe cited by Pillay (2006:170) have argued that the engagement of workers on 
economic issues with their employers (politics of production) and the contestation over political 
demands by citizens (politics of the state) is popular democratic politics. Pillay (2006) argues 
that  Webster  (1994)  uses  the  terms  social  movement  unionism  and  political  unionism 
interchangeably to refer to political  and economic struggle by workers. This is supported by 
Lambert and Webster (1988) who define political and social movement unionism as an attempt 
to link production to wider political issues by engaging factory based production politics as well 
as community and state politics. Webster (1994) prefers social movement unionism to political 
unionism because  it  arises  as  a  direct  response  to  political  and  economic  conditions  facing 
unions. Siedman (1994) has however separated political unionism from SMU by arguing that 
SMU is much broader than political unionism. Political unionism is “expressed through support 
for  political  parties”  (Siedman,  1994:  2).  This  analysis  helps  us  differentiate  between social 
movement  unions  and political  unions  especially  when assessing the  activities  of  CASWUZ 
between 1994 and 2004. 
When trade unions move away from state – market embeddedness (business unionism) to being 
autonomous institutions embedded in society, they can be termed social movement unions. As 
Webster  and  Lambert  (forthcoming)  argue,  the  “emphasis  is  on  cooperation  between  the 
workplace and society.” Lopez (2004:9) argues that “…the common denominator is reliance on 
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creative pressure strategies including, but not limited to, direct action, community alliances, and 
political intervention.” 
A much broader definition is given by Devinatz, (2008: 205) who argues that:
Social movement unionism is a trend in contemporary unionism in which workers and 
trade unions are united in larger coalitions with an array of community organizations for 
achieving mutual goals in furthering of economic and social justice.
The authors concur that SMU can only exist if there is a community and trade union alliance in 
pursuance of common economic and political goals and this is the path followed by CASWUZ.
Clawson, (2008) asserts that because of the global dominance of neo-liberalism, trade unions 
will be forced to adopt strategies consistent with SMU in order to survive and prosper in the 
coming years and ‘neo-liberalism guarantees a vibrant future for social movement unionism.’ 
This as Clawson (2008:207) puts it, is because workers only understand the need for collective 
organization when the boss humiliates them and ‘deny them their dignity,  when the company 
cuts their wages and benefits, when work hours are arbitrary and unfair, when conditions are 
unsafe and health is endangered.’ Whilst this is true, the argument leaves out the most important 
aspects  of  trade  union  and  community  alliance  in  defence  of  their  common  interests.  This 
argument might however be applicable to the global north, but not to the south. A number of 
scholars have argued that SMU started in South Africa as early as the 1970s in fighting against 
apartheid, yet Clawson argues that it is the fight against neo- liberalism that guarantees SMU. 
However, as Von Holdt (2002: 285) argues SMU is
a  highly  mobilized  form of  unionism which  emerges  in  opposition  to  authoritarian 
regimes and repressive workplaces in newly industrializing countries of the developing 
world,  and which is  based in  a  significant  expansion of  semi-skilled  manufacturing 
work.
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This definition is feasible as it  agrees with Webster (forthcoming, 2010) who postulates that 
SMU emerged in the Global South in the 1970s and 1980s. Grey (2006) argues that it is the 
social  movements  of  the  global  South  that  are  taken  as  key  examples  of  social  movement 
unionism. Von Holdt (2002:285) adds to the debate by arguing that, “SMU is embedded in a 
network of community and political alliances, and demonstrates a commitment both to internal 
democratic  and  socialist  transformation  of  authoritarian  societies.”  Von  Holdt’s  argument 
concurs with that of Webster (forthcoming, 2010) in that labour is seen as a social and political 
force other than just a commodity to be bargained for. As Polanyi (1944) predicted, society will 
take measures to protect itself from the disruption caused by commoditization. Polanyi refers to 
this  counter  movement  as  the  double  movement,  and  in  this  context  labour  is  the  counter 
movement.  Counter movements are the “usual backswing of the political  pendulum toward a 
state of affairs that had been violently disturbed” (Polanyi, 1944: 248). They may a spontaneous 
expression of public feeling, or front for interest groups. 
In the United States of America, the focus on social movement unionism is directed at organizing 
campaigns  around  contract  renewals  and  attempts  to  pass  legislation  among  other  issues 
(Clawson, 2008). Almost all labour issues are concerned with the environment, gender, ethnicity 
or the community and those linkages make it  much easier  to generate  movement  support (). 
While Clawson’s argument is quite convincing, he does not make a distinction on the issues that 
affect the north and those that affect the south. This is clarified by Fairbrother (2008: 213) who 
argues that “northern forms of unionism are often characterized as economistic, with narrowly 
focused  and  limited  views  of  emancipatory  politics,  a  feature  of  “business  unionism”.’ 
Fairbrother continues quoting Fantasia and Voss (2004), that such unionism is limited and self 
defeating.
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Clawson (2008) argues that social movements can take three forms all of which are likely to be 
important  in  the  coming  years;  they  are  global,  state  directed  and  community.  There  may 
however, be combinations of these. The most common form of social movement is the coalition 
between  unions  and  community  groups.  Fairbrother  (2008:214)  maintains  that  “in  social 
movement unionism neither the unions nor their members are passive in any sense” as they take 
the active lead in the streets as well as in politics. This argument concurs with most arguments 
advanced by South African scholars who tie social movement unionism to the anti – apartheid 
campaign  by COSATU (Von Holdt,  2002;  Bezuidenhout,  2000;  Webster,  1988).   Webster’s 
(1988: 194) argument that social movement unionism emerges ‘in authoritarian countries such as 
Philippines,  Brazil  and  South  Africa,  where  workers  are  excluded from the  central  decision 
making  process’  is  convincing.   This  reinforces  the  anti  –  apartheid  stance  adopted  by  the 
COSATU during the apartheid era.
Lambert  (1998:73)  has  argued  that  the  South  African  form  of  unionism  is  global  social 
movement  unionism,  which  “arises  when  unions  are  conscious  of  the  linkage  between 
workplace, civil society, the state and global forces and develop a strategy to resist the damaging 
pressures of globalization through creating a movement linking these spheres” and he is referring 
to  the  role  played  by  labour  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  against  apartheid.  Webster  cited  in 
Fairbrother  (2008:216) argues that the essence of social  movement  unionism is an appeal to 
workers that goes beyond the employment relationship to the totality of their lives, as consumers, 
citizens, family members and women.
Causes of strikes in the communications sector between 1994 and 2004
The concept of SMU can be looked at in view of strike action and its causes. Liberalization of 
the labour market by the Zimbabwe government in the early 1990s which replaced the wage 
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setting system put in place by the state of the 1980s led to an upsurge of strikes by workers to 
press for demands around collective bargaining and labour rights (Saunders, 2001).  The rise in 
militant strikes from 1994 onwards was triggered by the worsening socio – economic situation 
which made the resolution of workers demands urgent (Saunders, 2001). This was especially 
common  in  the  health,  telecommunications,  transport  and  education  because  of  unsolved 
grievances (Saunders, 2001). This is confirmed by an article carried by UNI global union which 
argues that ‘5,000 workers in TelOne (Zimbabwe) embarked on an indefinite strike on 17 May 
2004, after the company failed to implement an arbitrator’s award for a cost of living adjustment 
(COLA)’  (http://www.union-network.org/telecom ).   CASWUZ is  a  member  of  UNI  and at 
certain times during the strikes, UNI communicates with the employers on the importance of 
respecting labour rights.
Mobilization  theory also provides  helpful  guide  when considering  the  factors  that  prompted 
industrial action in the communications sector between 1994 and 2004. According Tilly (1978, 
as  cited  by Kelly,  1998) a  useful  theory of  collective  action  must  address five components: 
interests,  organization,  mobilization,  opportunity and forms of action.    The theory basically 
summarizes “how and why people acquire a sense of injustice or grievance” and how it develops 
into a  collective  grievance (Kelly,  1998: 27).  The mobilization  theory shares some common 
ground with SMU since the feeling of unfair treatment compels individuals to act as collectives 
to fight the injustice. This confirms PTC workers went on strike because they felt a sense of 
economic and political injustice as postulated by mobilization theory. 
It is important to also articulate the issue of power when it comes to tirade union activities. What 
are the sources of power for trade unions? According to Silver (2003:13) associational power is 
defined as “the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organizations 
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of workers” (most importantly trade unions and political parties – social movements). Structural 
power is the power that accrues to workers simply as a result of their location in the economic 
system.  Wright  (2000:962)  as  cited  in  Webster  et  al  (2008)  distinguishes  two  subtypes  of 
structural power: market bargaining power which results directly from tight labour markets and 
workplace bargaining power resulting from the strategic location of a particular group of workers 
within a key industrial sector. Silver (2003) argues that workplace bargaining power accrues to 
workers who are enmeshed in tightly integrated production processes where a localized work 
stoppage in a key node can disrupt the system more widely. It can be argued that the CASWUZ 
possessed both associational power and structural power because of the strategic importance of 
the sector at the time. The adoption of new sources of power represents a shift in strategy by the 
union.
Kraus (2007) has recently argued that there has been a boom in research on a variety of topics 
related to post colonial African studies, including on ‘ethnic groups, women’s groups, students, 
market women, and many other local social groups.’ He however, laments the dearth of research 
on trade unions over the past few years. This is despite the fact that workers and trade unions 
have  been  among  the  most  crucial  groups  demanding  and  forcing  authoritarian  regimes  to 
liberalize political life across the continent (Kraus 2007:1). 
Since independence Zimbabwe drifted from being a democratic state to an authoritarian regime 
that  repressed  the  trade  union  movement  and  any  dissenting  voices.  Raftopoulos  (1992:57) 
argues  that  “this  authoritarian  process  appeared  to  be  culminating  in  a  formal  one-party 
presidentialist state, de facto one-party rule having being achieved in the late 1980s.” The trade 
union  movement  was  targeted  as  it  posed  the  most  formidable  challenge  to  the  regime. 
Authoritarianism led to the rise of defective institutions and a negative economic climate which 
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had a negative impact on workers. Workers in the communication industry have consistently 
expressed  their  frustration  concerning  these  defective  structures  through  various  actions, 
including strikes. 
Asserting the trade union federation’s independence from the government the then president of 
the  ZCTU,  Gibson  Sibanda,  expressed  unequivocally  labour’s  desire  to  have  effectively 
functioning democratic institutions at trade union and national governance level at a May Day 
rally in 1991, a view that was shared by many workers at the shop floor.  
Trade unions and democracy in Africa
“The existence of strong trade unions has historically been central to the creation of a 
democratic order.  Labour in Africa, as was the case in Europe and North America, has 
been at the forefront of the struggle to create and maintain democratic institutions and 
democratic rule” (Webster, 2009:432). 
History has proved that vibrant militant independent trade unions are the most important and 
formidable force against despotism. The role of trade unions in the struggle for democracy since 
the colonial era has been a source of debate amongst many scholars (Webster, 2009). 
In his compelling book titled “Trade Unions and the coming of democracy in Africa” Kraus 
(2007) looks at seven different countries, Senegal, Niger, Ghana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
and  South  Africa  and  identifies  three  different  models  of  trade  union  involvement  in  the 
democratization  process.  In  Niger,  South  Africa,  Zambia,  and  Zimbabwe ‘union  strikes  and 
mobilization directly prompted political liberalization while in Ghana and Senegal trade unions 
pattern of struggles created the “political space” that induced political liberalization.’ In Namibia 
white minority rule was resisted through labour strikes,  thus helping the democratic struggle 
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(Kraus 2007:256-7). Although the three dimensions of the role of trade unions highlighted by 
Kraus are significant in the process of democratization, this study will draw on the trajectories of 
South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe whose experiences in union strikes and mobilization led to 
political liberalization or played a significant role. 
In Nigeria, the labour movement and the first nationalist party the National Congress of Nigeria 
and the Cameroons  (NCNC) worked together  to fight  colonial  injustice.  Viiniika (2008:128) 
argues that the NCNC “was the first political organization to try to bring together nationalism 
and the nascent working class movement, even giving its support of the 1945 general strike.” 
This relationship ended prematurely two years later in 1947 when political mobilization along 
the  previously  politically  impotent  lines  of  ethnicity  was  drafted  in  the  British  Richards 
Constitution. 
Since then the labour movement has remained independent of the state and has confronted it on 
bread and butter issues and also on democracy issues. The Joint Action Committee (JAC) called the 
first general strike in post colonial Nigeria on the 1st of June 1964 to press for higher wages. The strike 
pulled many who traditionally were not inclined to take industrial action such as domestic servants and 
the  unemployed  (Viiniika,  2008).  This  is  confirmed  by Cohen (1974)  who postulates  that  the  strike 
involved more than 75 000 workers,  most  of them whom were not unionists.  This reveals that social 
injustice can unite workers whether they belong to a trade union or not. As Clawson (2008) would argue, 
“the boss is the best organizer.”  Viiniika (2008) argues that the Babangida administration refused to 
implement  the  International  Monetary  Fund  Structural  Adjustment  Programme  (IMF  SAP)  as 
neocolonialism only to  implement  the  same packages  in  the  guise  of  being Nigerian.  These had far 
reaching effects on the poor and working class. It would seem like African governments take on board 
these SAPs without any due consideration for the working class and the poor given the common hymn in 
Africa is, “you should tighten your belts.”  Nigeria experienced seven military coups d’état between 1965 
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and 1999 when civilian rule and democracy was attained. The labour movement played a pivotal role 
during this period to bring democracy to Nigeria.
Zambia  is  an  interesting  case  study  whose  experiences  parallel  the  post  independence  history  of 
Zimbabwe’s  labour  movement.  According  to  Akwetey  and  Kraus  (2007:  125),  “the  expansion  of 
unionized labour in Zambia was the direct result of the labor and development policies of the United 
Independence Party (UNIP) regime.” Gwisai (2008) argues that the ZANU – PF government played a 
leading role in the formation of the ZCTU in 1981. This explains why labour in the two countries was 
loyal to the ruling party in the first decade or so of independence. The Zambian Mine Workers Union was 
however, unwilling to be in alliance with the state. Kaunda, as indicated by Larmer (2008:162), argued 
for union loyalty to the party when he said, “we want loyal  party leaders also to control the...labour 
movements.  We cannot afford the luxury of calling this undemocratic.” To confirm this, many union 
leaders  were  incorporated  into  UNIP  as  Members  of  Parliament  or  cabinet  ministers  who  further 
strengthened their loyalty to the party.
Despite the loyalty of the trade union leadership to UNIP, ‘unconstitutional’ strikes continued to 
occur  with little  or no justification  and with monotonous  frequency (Larmer,  2008).  This  is 
supported by Kraus and Akwetey (2007:126-7) who argues that “in the post-independence flush 
of  high  worker  expectations,  the  strikes  persisted,  and  the  ZCTU appeared  unable  either  to 
control or deter their spread.” UNIP’s desire to subordinate labour can be further demonstrated 
after  this wave of strikes when the labour minister  summoned union leaders and asked them 
“Why have you tolerated…wildcat strikes? Have you no control over your members? Have your 
members no respect for you...if so you shouldn’t be where you are” (Larmer, 2008:164). This 
goes on to show that despite the state’s desire to control the union leadership, it cannot control 
the rank and file as long as it is dissatisfied. 
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The coming in of new leadership of the ZCTU in the form of Newstead Zimba and Frederick 
Chiluba in 1971 and 1974 respectively marked the beginning of the breaking of the ZCTU – 
UNIP alliance. The same thing happened in Zimbabwe with the coming in of Morgan Tsvangirai 
and  Jeffrey  Mutandare  in  1988.  This  demonstrates  how  new  leadership  can  influence  an 
ideological shifts as indicated by the decision to form a political party. The lack of democracy in 
Zambia (one party state) and the continued deterioration of the economy and implementation of 
neo-liberal  policies  led  to  the  severing  of  relations  and  the  subsequent  formation  of  the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) in July 1990. The labour movement in Zambia 
was responsible for the removal of UNIP and it was also instrumental in the formation of the 
MMD  which  assumed  power  in  1991.  The  ZCTU  has  continued  to  fight  for  wages  and 
democracy to this day.
South Africa got its independence in April 1994. The South African labour movement deserves 
special mention because it kept the mass democratic movement’s torch alive during the absence 
of the nationalist movements. Trade unions asserted their power in the fight against apartheid in 
the mid to late 1980s through mass stay-aways leading to loss of many working days between 
1986 and 1990 (Dwyer, 2008). Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) alliance dates back 
to the struggle against apartheid. Dwyer (2008:189) argues that the triple alliance “epitomizes the 
development of the independent labour movement that carried on the fight against apartheid.” 
This is because the COSATU continued to fight for wages and democracy in the face of a ban on 
political  parties.  Despite  being  elected  on  RDP policy  framework  in  1994,  which  was  pro- 
Keynesian based on redistribution; the ANC dumped it in favour of neo liberal GEAR policy 
framework a neo – liberal economic policy which was imposed unilaterally. It is interesting to 
25
note that RDP was crafted by the COSATU and refined by the ANC. Despite the domination of 
the alliance by the ANC, the COSATU has recently demonstrated that  they are not a junior 
partner in the alliance as evidenced by their ability to endorse Jacob Zuma as party president and 
the subsequent removal of Thabo Mbeki from office. The labour body recently endorsed Jacob 
Zuma as the ANC candidate  in  the polls  because they feel  he understands the plight  of the 
workers. The “hegemonic” role of trade union shows that labour is never a spent force and at 
times  it  rises to  the occasion to  assert  society’s  views.  As argued by von Holdt  (1994:303) 
“resistance was the terrain they knew best” and it produces results.
Drawing from the above discussion,  it  can be argued that  labour movements  in Africa were 
fighting the same cause as nationalist  movements. Labour movements are however not static 
organizations as witnessed in Nigeria, Zambia and South Africa were they intermittently clashed 
with their national governments when they felt their interests were under threat. 
Zimbabwe
The first attempts at regulating black labour in colonial Zimbabwe was as early as 1895 when the 
provincial labour bureau was founded, followed by the establishment of the Labour Board of 
Southern  Rhodesia,  and  the  Rhodesia  Native  Labour  Bureau  (RNLB)  in  1899 (Sachikonye, 
1987).  These  institutions  were  supported  by  legislation  such  as  the  Master  and  Servant 
Ordinance  of  1901;  the  Pass  Law  of  1902;  the  Private  Locations  Ordinance  of  1910;  the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934; the Native Registration Act of 1936; and the Compulsory 
Native Labour Act of 1943. This collection of legislation was meant to repress unionisation and 
tone down political activity (Sachikonye, 1987).
According to Sachikonye (1987:250) “harsh and dismal working conditions” provoked organized 
strikes as early as 1895 and through the 1920s at mines such as Shamva and Wankie and others. 
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However, the first black trade union, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was 
found in 1927 by migrant workers from South Africa who soon organized strikes against poor 
wages (Orr, 1966; Gwisai, 2008). Gwisai (2008) argues that the ICU floundered during the great 
depression  in  the  1930s  mainly  due  to  state  repression  and  the  intermittent  nature  of  work 
performed by semi- skilled workers who would occasionally go back to their rural home in and 
outside  Southern  Rhodesia.   This  meant  that  the  only  section  of  the  workforce  that  could 
challenge the status quo at the time was the white working class. They had formed the Rhodesia 
Railway Workers  Union (1916),  while  the  Rhodesia  Mine  and General  Workers  association 
(RMGWA) was formed in 1919. They led successful strikes demanding pay increases and a 
forty-eight hour week and these conditions were applicable to the white workers only (Gwisai, 
2008).
The 1945 Railway workers’ strike led by Joshua Nkomo and the 1948 general  strike led by 
Benjamin  Burombo  were  precursors  to  the  formation  of  the  first  viable  black  workers 
organization, the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SRTUC) in 1954. The basis of the 
1948 general strike by black workers was to protest against poor wages and to demand a living 
wage nationally as well as adequate accommodation and health facilities. The involvement of the 
black  non  working  class  in  the  1948  strike  strongly  suggests  a  nascent  social  movement 
unionism in the early trade union movement  in Zimbabwe.  This  however,  failed to  take off 
because of lack of leadership. Gwisai (2002: 228) indicates that ‘the “Zhii” strike movement of 
1960-61 saw massive strikes in Harare and Bulawayo  and combined economic  and political 
demands.’ The rise of the working class was only stopped by the brutal colonial state under Ian 
Smith who took over power in 1962 and declared the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) from Britain in 1965.
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After the UDI in 1965, all politically inclined unions became victims of the repressive legislation 
such as the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) and the Emergency Powers Act. Hundreds 
of  trade  unionists  were  arrested  and  jailed  under  these  laws  for  going  on  illegal  strike  and 
associating with nationalist parties or the World Federation of Trade Unions, which had been 
outlawed (Gwisai,  2002). These repressive laws led to the division of the working class with 
some unions preferring the workerist / economism route as they felt challenging the status quo 
might  affect  their  economic  gains.  Strikes  also  fell  from 138 in  1965  to  nineteen  in  1971. 
Sachikonye  (1987)  asserts  that  it  is  therefore  not  accidental  nor  is  it  surprising  that  at 
independence the labour movement was weak as it had been subjected to internal fractions and 
external harassment.
The labour movement in Zimbabwe faced challenges such as weak organizational structure and 
lack of unity prior to independence and the implementation of neoliberal policies by the state in 
the 1990s (Saunders, 2007). Zimbabwe gained its independence from British colonial rule on 18 
April  1980.  Prime  Minister-elect  Mugabe told  the  nation  in  1980:  “We are  socialist…basic 
wages and working conditions of black and white must be based on an equal footing” (Saunders, 
2007: 161-2). But the promise of achieving equality between black and white workers did not 
materialize, triggering an upsurge in strike action by black workers. Gwisai (2008) estimates that 
there were two hundred strikes, in nearly every sector of the economy. Most of the strikes took 
place independently and beyond the control of existing union structures.  In many ways these 
strikes  concerned  long  standing  grievances  such  as  low  wages,  racist  managers  and 
discrimination against  trade union representation (Zeilig,  2007). This shows that if the union 
leadership does not push for a strike, then the rank and file can go on unofficial strikes as seen in 
Nigeria and Zambia.  In order to contain the upsurge of strikes, the state in 1981 created the 
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ZCTU, which was dominated by staunch supporters of the ZANU-PF government, who included 
its president, Alfred Makwarimba, and general secretary, Albert Mugabe (Gwisai, 2008). This 
meant that the ZCTU was subordinate to the state.
 In 1985, the Labour Relations Act (LRA) was introduced with the aim of addressing colonial 
wage and working conditions imbalances as well  as to curb industrial  unrest.  However,  “the 
LRA  severely  undercut  labour  rights  by  banning  strikes  in  “essential  services,”  which  the 
government  defined  so broadly that  the  vast  majority  of  workers  were  included”  (Saunders, 
2007: 163-4). Because of the need to fulfill their mandate from the workers, trade unions always 
adopted other strategies and also defied the provisions of the LRA by going on unauthorized 
strikes.  The  1988  ZCTU  congress  brought  in  new  leaders,  Jeffrey  Mutandare  and  Morgan 
Tsvangirai. These leaders adopted a workerist approach and advocated for independence from 
the state hence adopting a more confrontational approach.
In  1991 a  full  package  of  neoliberal  reforms,  the  Economic  Structural  Adjustment  Program 
(ESAP), was announced and was launched with the backing of the World Bank and IMF as well 
as Western donor countries (Saunders, 2007). The ESAP failed to foster growth, and the short 
term shocks turned quickly into a chronic and worsening social crisis. The impacts of the ESAP 
on the working class were far reaching as many people in the public sector lost their jobs. In 
view of these changes trade unions had to adopt new strategies to suit the changing environment. 
In 1992 Government pushed LRA amendments through parliament against the combined voices 
of  workers  and  employers  and  at  the  same  time  using  state  controlled  media  to  allege  the 
ZCTU’s political ambitions. By 1993 it was becoming clear that the ZCTU and the ZANU PF 
government could no longer work together. According to The Worker of June 1993, when asked 
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why he refused to go and address the workers on May Day, President Mugabe was quoted as 
saying “I cannot come to address an organization that is going to form a political party. I cannot 
go to be a subject of ridicule. We cannot go to be laughed at. We have some dignity to protect.” 
Saunders (2007) argues that new waves of large scale, high profile industrial actions in public 
and private sectors in 1996 and 1997 were witnessed and these were the largest since the 1948 
general  strike.  The  significance  of  these  strikes  reveals  the  shift  in  strategy  of  the  labour 
movement as they take issues beyond the workplace to involve issues that affect society.   In 
February 1999 the ZCTU convened a National Working People’s Convention, which led to the 
formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) on 11 September 1999, almost six 
years after Mugabe predicted the formation of an opposition political party by the labour body. 
In  June  2000,  the  MDC  came  close  to  defeating  ZANU-PF  in  the  parliamentary  elections 
(Gwisai,  2008).  The  formation  of  the  MDC by the  workers  reflected  a  shift  from business 
unionism to social movement unionism as other civil society groups became involved in this 
autonomous organization free from the state’s control. Despite the role played by unions and the 
CASWUZ in particular,  there  has been a  dearth  in  terms of  literature  pertaining  to  its  role. 
CASWUZ is an important  player  in the formation of the MDC for three reasons. Firstly,  its 
General Secretary (GS) became one of the top five founding members of the MDC and one of 
the first parliamentarians on an MDC ticket. Secondly, the ZCTU Presidency was taken over by 
CASWUZ when MDC was formed. Lastly, its lawyer Tendai Biti was also among the top five of 
the MDC. This meant that CASWUZ had more than forty percent stake in the MDC top five and 
had a lot of work to do for the new party to succeed. 
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The impact of ESAP and neo – liberal policies in the communications sector
The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was launched in Zimbabwe in 1991 at 
the behest of the IMF (Kanyenze, 2003). According to Saunders (1996:1) ESAP “was meant to 
herald  a  new  era  of  modernized,  competitive  export  led  industrialization.”  This  was  a 
fundamental shift from a welfare state to one driven by market forces. The expectation was that 
the ESAP would raise investment levels thereby facilitating higher growth rate and employment 
creation,  and  uplifting  the  standard  of  living  of  the  majority  of  the  people.  The  SAP  was 
implemented with the intention of healing an ailing economy and reaping benefits for workers. 
However, as Saunders (1996:30) observes, the result ‘was a sharp decline in average real wages.’ 
By the mid 1990s, the average real wages had fallen to their lowest since the early 1970s hence 
bringing the working class to near destitution. Kanyenze (2003) observes that in most sectors of 
the  economy the  average  minimum wage (excluding  parastatals  and domestic  services)  was 
around Z$2500 which amounted to 30 percent of the Poverty Datum Line (Z$8310) as at June of 
2000.  In August of the same year, workers in the communication sector experienced their worst 
nightmare when the employers reversed a 300 percent increment it had awarded its workers by 
more than half citing operational constraints.
It should be highlighted that the Government of Zimbabwe did not consult civil society in the 
design  of  ESAP.  Kanyenze  (2003)  and  Saunders  (1996)  both  indicate  that  public  sector 
associations were concerned by the imposition of World Bank and IMF plans without “regard to 
the views or suggestions of those who actually work in the system.”  The same applies to the 
communications sector where most of the operations were commercialized without the consent 
of the labour union, much to the detriment of worker morale and productivity.  As part of the 
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SAP the companies in the communication sector also embarked on a downsizing exercise in 
1999 – 2000. 
Studies conducted by the Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS) of the ministry of Public 
Service, Labour and Social Welfare in 1995 revealed that 61 percent of families lived in poverty 
and 45 percent in extreme poverty with the major cause of poverty being identified as structural 
(Kanyenze, 2003). As early as 1993 the country experienced its first “IMF” riots when the lifting 
of subsidies and decontrol of market prices sent the prices soaring 30 per cent with a ‘bread 
boycott’  lasting  two  weeks  (Saunders,  1996:30).  These  riots  were  the  forerunner  of  the 
communications sector strike of 1994.   Most workers participated in these riots although without 
union sanction.
Shifting policy of the union: the endorsement of the MDC
ZANU-PF’s strategy of penetrating, encircling, and undermining the ZCTU’s senior ranks led to 
growing tensions  and mismanagement  within  the organization  (Saunders,  2007).  This  would 
trigger a shift in strategy by the unions at the end of the 1980s as they began advocates for 
autonomy.
During  the  first  decade  of  independence,  however,  most  trade  unions  were  pro  government 
including the Zimbabwe Posts and Telecommunication Workers Union (now CASWUZ). “In the 
1990 election, the growing autonomy of the ZCTU was demonstrated by its refusal to endorse 
ZANU-PF,  while  many  workers  tacitly  supported  a  new break  away party,  Edgar  Tekere’s 




Labour movements in Africa have played a crucial role in social transformation. Undoubtedly, 
sometimes they are used by politicians to achieve political ends. It is the aim of this research to 
unearth the developments in public sector strikes in Zimbabwe between 1994 and 2004 and their 




The post 1980 industrial relations can be viewed from two schools of thought. Firstly there was 
an urgent need to control the upsurge in industrial action which was a direct response to the 
political changeover. Workers were expecting the colonial inequalities to be addressed. Secondly 
the government responded by compelling the existing six labour bodies to amalgamate and form 
one body which was expected to be subordinate to the state. This was in line with the principle of 
one industry one union which the new government had adopted from the Industrial Conciliation 
Act  (ICA) in  force during the  colonial  era.  This  was  a  positive  development  for  previously 
marginalized unions and this chapter will highlight the development of unions specifically in the 
public  sector.  The  chapter  is  set  to  explore  the  relations  between  Zimbabwe  Posts  and 
Telecommunication  Workers  Union  (ZPTWU) and  the  state/employer  in  the  1980s  and  the 
unfolding antagonism. The ensuing confrontation with the state led the ZPTWU to be accused of 
pursuing  a  political  agenda.  This  is  not  surprising  though  because  public  sector  strikes  are 
inherently political as they are directed at the state.
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Post Independence Industrial Relations
In  a  bid  to  address  colonial  inequalities  on  wages  and  working  conditions  the  government 
promulgated legislation on minimum wages as from 1 July 1980. Madhuku (2001) has argued 
that  this  was  some  form of  payback  to  the  workers  for  their  support  during  the  liberation 
struggle. This legislation had a positive effect on the lowly paid workers especially in agriculture 
and the domestics. Nonetheless, concerns were raised that the set minimum wage was below the 
poverty datum line (PDL) and thus only had a minimal impact on the general levels of poverty. 
Although  the  Labour  Relations  Act  (LRA)  of  1985  was  an  important  development  in  post 
independent  Zimbabwe  especially  given  that  the  fundamental  rights  of  workers  were 
incorporated  into the  new legislation,  it  was  criticized  for  inheriting  some provisions  of  the 
colonial Industrial Conciliation Act most prominently the one industry one union requirement. 
However, the LRA of 1985 classified most public sector jobs as essential service and sectors 
covered included the transport and communication sector. According to Sachikonye (1987:261) 
“the very broad scope of the essential services sector underscored the deterrent aspect of the 
Labour  Relations  Act  with  regard  to  industrial  action.”  In  order  to  deter  industrial  action, 
embarking on an unsanctioned industrial action was criminalized according to the LRA section 
109(1) which states that “…shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level 
fourteen  or  imprisonment  for  a  period  not  exceeding  five  years,  or  both  such  fine  and 
imprisonment.”. This meant that the activities of CASWUZ were affected in terms of going on 
strike.
By appointing the ZCTU inaugural leadership in February 1981, the government made sure it 
controlled  labour  as  indicated  in  the  introduction  to  chapter  one.  Ironically,  the  LRA 
strengthened the ZCTU through the one industry one union law but weakened the rank and file 
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through the ban on strikes and use of union funds for political purposes (Gwisai, 2002). More so 
those elected were ruling party apologists and its first president in line with government policy of 
anti-strike,  made  a  scathing  attack  on  striking  workers  saying  strikes  were  not  good  for 
development no matter how genuine the grievance was (Gwisai, 2002). In 1981 Prime Minister 
Mugabe  attacked  striking  nurses  as  un-revolutionary  and  the  government  reintroduced  the 
Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act to arrest, detain and beat the 
working class as was the case during the colonial era (Gwisai, 2002). This created a rift between 
the leadership and government on the one hand and the workers on the other such that the new 
ZCTU leadership elected in 1988 started to move away from state corporatism to workerism in 
the late 1980s to early 1990s. The new leadership saw the need to create strong rank-and-file as 
the basis  of achieving  their  goal of independence  from the state  and by the 1991 May Day 
celebrations, agitation against the government policy had already started. The substantive issues 
mainly centred on social, economic and political effects brought about by the introduction of 
ESAP in 1991 (Kondo, 2000). As a precursor to the 1999 National Working Peoples Convention 
(NWPC), the ZCTU consulted widely with all sections of civil society and most prominently 
public servants, church organizations and non governmental organizations starting 1996 (Kondo, 
2000).  The ZCTU had already indicated its opposition to ESAP when it published an alternative 
economic policy (Beyond ESAP) in 1996. It indicated that its ideas were not being taken on 
board satisfactorily hence the need for wider consultation with civil society through a NWPC. 
During  the  wider  consultations  pertinent  issues  affecting  labour  especially  unemployment, 
corruption, one party politics, unbudgeted government expenditure nepotism and deregulation of 
the  labour  market  were  noted  of  which  government  was  evasive  (Kondo,  2000).  As  a  way 
forward, the NWPC resolved in February 1999 that an opposition party be formed hence the 
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Movement  for  Democratic  Change  (MDC)  was  formed  on  11  September  1999.  The  MDC 
election manifesto of 2000 clearly states that the party stands for the “working people, that is the 
workers and peasants” by subscribing to the principles of a participatory, accountable and honest 
government,  sustainable  and  human  centred  development  and  investing  in  the  people  for 
development (Kondo, 2000: 157-185). Unlike ZANU PF, the MDC was organically linked to the 
union  movement  and  have  pursued  objectives  to  effect  meaningful  changes  in  the  lives  of 
ordinary citizens. MDC became the first ever opposition party to seriously challenge ZANU PF 
at the polls in 2000 when it got 57 out of the 120 contested seats and its impact was felt again in 
the 2008 harmonized (elections for the presidency members of parliament, senators and local 
government councilors all in one) elections in which ZANU PF failed to get its traditional two 
thirds majority prompting the formation of a government of national unity (GNU). The combined 
opposition garnered 110 votes of the 210 contested seats.
Despite the ZCTU’s support for the opposition, the labour centre has continued to maintain its 
independence from the opposition by continuously saying that it has no permanent friends but 
permanent issues. Recently the Secretary General of the ZCTU threatened that the ZCTU might 
pull out of its alliance with the MDC if it continues to be insensitive to the workers plight. At the 
inception of the MDC, members within the ZCTU general council identified CASWUZ as union 
in  a sector  of  the economy that  can be of  use when it  comes  to  industrial  action  on socio-
economic issues. Matombo would comment “yes CASWUZ was a reliable partner in the national 
centre when it came to job action”.2 The CASWUZ which inaugurated industrial action in 1994 
was equal to the task and played this  leadership role for a number  of years.  The CASWUZ 
leadership failed to realize that they were playing into the ZANU PF ball game as these strikes 
2 Interview with Lovemore Matombo, the CASWUZ and ZCTU President, Harare, 06 July 2009.
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led to the dismissal of more than fifty percent of communication workers which it represents (in 
2004)  for  participating  in  industrial  action.  The  once  strong  union  had  internal  leadership 
squabbles before the 2004 strike which not only divided the leadership in terms of going on 
strike,  but  the  workers  as  well.  The  dismissals  were  a  carefully  planned  exercise  by  the 
government to retrench workers at  no cost that  had been mooted in early 2004 according to 
revelations by a TelOne company executive at a workshop held in Kadoma in May 2009. The 
company had been instructed to lay off almost half of its workforce by the government but it did 
not have enough resources to do so hence strike action became an opportune time.3 Despite 
winning  the  case  against  dismissal  in  the  lower  courts,  the  Supreme  Court  overturned  the 
decisions  that  were  in  favour  of  workers  and  sanctioned  management’s  decision  to  dismiss 
workers using the wrong legal apparatus, the PTC sector employment code of conduct which is 
inferior to the Labour Act when dealing with collective disputes. All the Supreme Court cases 
were presided over by Chief  Justice  Chidyausiku  whom the unions perceive  to be biased in 
favour of the state.4 The current CASWUZ executive has continued to fight for the return to 
work by the  dismissed  workers  and is  now pursuing it  at  a  political  level  where they have 
recently handed in a petition to the Minister  of Labour and the Minister  of Information and 
Communication Technology in the hope that the state might intervene and return the workers to 
work or pay them damages (The Herald, 24 August 2009).
History of the Posts and Telecommunications in Zimbabwe
The history of the posts and telecommunication is tied to colonialism in Zimbabwe. It dates back 
to the pioneer’s  period when Reverend J.S. Moffat  started a letter  delivery services between 
3 Interview, James Gondo (CASWUZ Education Officer), Johannesburg, 06 September 2009.
4 Interview, James Gondo (CASWUZ Education Officer), Johannesburg, 06 September 2009.
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Mafikeng (in  north-west  of South Africa)  and Gubulawayo  (Bulawayo  -  in  south – west  of 
colonial Zimbabwe) on the 21st of August 1888. Bechuanaland (Botswana) postage stamps were 
used, but the British South Africa Company (BSAC) introduced its own stamps on the 2nd of 
January 1892 (Smith, 1967:13). In 1890 (11th July) the pioneer column crossed river Shashi to 
Fort Tuli and huts were erected every forty miles to serve as postal relay stations. A regular horse 
postal service was established and operated by the British South Africa Police (BSAP) led by 
Colonel  Pennefather.  Postal  routes and telegraph lines followed the pioneer routes and often 
preceded the mining and agricultural settlements. Smith (1967) points out that the Post Office 
was originally administered under the Cape of Good Hope Post Office Act Number 4 of 1882 
and the Electric and Telegraph Act Number 20 of 1861. Rhodesia only passed its own post and 
telegraph  legislation  in  1901  (Smith,  1967:13).  The  first  Postmaster  General  (PMG)  of  the 
General  Post  Office  (GPO) as  the  Posts  and  Telecommunications  was then  known was Mr. 
A.F.C. Duncan (Smith, 1967:14). 
British colonialism placed a high premium on communications. Cecil John Rhodes regarded the 
posts and telegraph service as an integral part of the development of the interior as this was the 
only  means  of  distant  communication  at  the  time.  Telegraph  was  a  faster  means  of 
communication  compared  to  mail  which  could  take  anything  up  to  six  months  to  reach  its 
destination.  Salisbury (now Harare)  only became connected  to  Mafeking  and Cape Town in 
1892, four years after Bulawayo was connected. Copper wires (for telephone transmission) were 
initially introduced in 1904 when a line of six copper conductors from Bulawayo to Heaney 
Junction (about 30 kilometres outside Bulawayo) was erected in 1898 (Smith, 1967).
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According to Smith (1967: 151), the police were the first  to install  telephones in (Southern) 
Rhodesia  when  they  connected  police  camps  at  Salisbury,  Bulawayo  and  Gwelo  with 
surrounding Forts. The first public Telephone Exchange switchboard in Salisbury was installed 
on 15th August 1898. It consisted of a 50 line Erricsons Magneto Switchboard and 37 subscribers 
connected to it. A new 300 line Exchange was installed in 1914 which doubled to 600 in 1915 
(Smith,  1967:150;  155).  The  telephone  service  was  only  introduced  to  the  public  on  an 
experimental basis on 2 November 1914 and it was well received. The service was later extended 
to  the  rural  white  farming  and  mining  communities  and  to  some  extent  even  in  African 
administrative centres such that by 1965 there were over 10000 rural telephone subscribers.
After the breakup of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 19635, the new thinking by the 
colonial government was to divorce the postal services from the telecommunications services. 
This  subsequently  led  to  the  announcement  of  a  proposal  by  the  Minister  of  Posts  on  10 
December 1966 of a statutory body to be formed to take over the Telecommunication services in 
Rhodesia  on  1  July,  1968.  However,  the  Postal  service  was  to  continue  to  operate  as  a 
Government Department under the Ministry Of Posts. When the actual Act of parliament was 
passed in 1970 the telecommunication and communication services remained as one entity. 
The  Posts  and Telecommunications  Corporation  (PTC) therefore  started  operating  as  a  state 
owned  enterprises  (SOE)  or  parastatal  on  the  1st of  July  1970  according  to  the  Posts  and 
Telecommunications Act of 1970 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1970). The enterprise was created 
by Acts of parliament and was governed by the Posts and Telecommunications Services Act 
5 Between 1953 and 1963 Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were amalgamated into a 
federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The federation broke up when Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and 
Nyasaland (now Malawi) got their independence.
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(Chapter  250)  and  the  Posts  and  Telecommunications  Corporation  Act  (Chapter  251).  The 
designation of the Chief Executive Officer remained as Postmaster General (PMG) although this 
position was mostly occupied by an engineer. The PMG was responsible for both postal and 
telecommunication services as well as the people’s savings bank. Its board comprised mainly 
engineers and it reported to a ministry with several areas of administration which included roads, 
information and mass media. The civil servants manning these ministries did not have specialist 
education. The PTC management and control was bureaucratic with the Minister having the final 
decision.
Before independence in 1980 certain jobs such as telecommunication technicians, engineers and 
top management were almost exclusively the preserve for the whites. After independence the 
black led government adopted a policy of black advancement in the public service as well as 
state  owned  enterprises.  This  policy  had  unintended  effects  on  the  PTC’s  operations  and 
efficiency  (Bond  and  Manyanya,  2002).  High  levels  of  resignation  and  emigration  by 
experienced white technicians, posed a challenge to the maintenance of service delivery, a fact 
that  was  lamented  by  the  then  PTC  Director  of  Personnel  Kenneth  Manyonda  (TelePost 
December  1998).  These  developments  saw  nearly  all  the  technicians,  engineers,  and  top 
management levels in PTC being filled by black Zimbabweans by 1990. It is significant to note 
that there were no reports of racial tension amongst the employees in the PTC throughout the 
period of black advancement.
According to the Postal  and Telecommunication  Services Act  of 1996 the PTC has enjoyed 
monopoly starting 1st of April 1973 and it clearly spelt out that only the PTC was mandated “to 
regulate  and control the provision of postal  and telecommunication services within,  into and 
from Zimbabwe; and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing.” For 
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this  reason the PTC has been the sole provider and backbone of plain old telephone service 
(POTS) and it own the public switched telephone network (PSTN) commonly referred to as fixed 
network telephones.  Private  suppliers of radio communication and private automatic  booking 
exchanges (PABXs) have up to now be licenced by TelOne one of the successor companies to 
PTC.
For  slightly  over  half  a  decade  the  PTC monopoly was challenged  in  the  courts  by Econet 
leading  to  the  opening  up  of  the  sector  to  the  operators  of  mobile  phones.  However,  PTC 
managed to use its monopoly to set up the first mobile phone operator NetOne in 1996 which 
became one of the successor companies in 2000 when the PTC was restructured. Restructuring 
of the PTC was a response to the outcome of the PTC - Enhanced Communications Network 
(Econet) court case which allowed other players to operate mobile phones. Econet had sought to 
be PTC’s cell-phone partner as early as the 1990s but PTC officials were against the idea. In 
1993 Retrofit requested from the PTC as the sole regulator of telecommunication services to be 
licenced to operate a private cellular network in Zimbabwe but the PTC refused arguing that the 
governing  Act  did  not  allow  them  to  do  so  (Newsweek,  July  29,  1996; 
http://www.btimes.co.za/98/1018/world/world03.htm ).  In  January  1994  Retrofit  (Econet) 
approached the High Court on the case and PTC was ordered to consider Retrofit’s case within 
two  months.  The  PTC  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court  and  won,  leaving  Retrofit  to  again 
challenge the constitutionality of the PTC monopoly in the High Court and subsequently in the 
Supreme Court (Newsweek, July 29, 1996). Econet wireless was established by Retrofit in 1994 
with a view of starting cellular business and had already started buying and installing cellular 
network equipment when its challenge to the PTC monopoly was being heard in the courts. The 
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ensuing  court  battle  is  clear  testimony  that  government  was  unwilling  to  open  up  the 
telecommunication industry.
In the Supreme Court case heard in June 1995, Econet wireless challenged the PTC monopoly 
with reference to the Bill of rights as enshrined in the National Constitution of Zimbabwe (S.I. 
1979/1600 of the United Kingdom) section 20 subsection 1 which guarantees every Zimbabwean 
citizen the right to free access to information and means of information. Telephony was defined 
as  such  means  of  information  hence  the  courts  concluded  (Judgment  Number  S.C  238/95 
delivered  on  18  December  1995)  the  PTC  monopoly  was  a  violation  of  the  constitution 
(http://www.btimes.co.za/98/1018/world/world03.htm ).  The  government  could  not  therefore 
deny private business entry into the telecommunication industry if PTC was unable to meet the 
legitimate demands of mobile phones as a means of information by its citizens. Mr. J. Chideme, 
the deputy PMG (cellular mobile telephone services) made a comment on the high court ruling to 
deregulate the industry: “it’s now up to the government to set up instruments which would allow 
another operator to compete with PTC”( TelePost, January 1997).
The opening up of the sector to private players was in line with the government adoption of a 
ESAP according to the PTC Director of Corporate Planning Mr. I.T Chaza (TelePost January 
1997)  a  point  which  was  supported  by  the  then  minister  of  Information  Posts  and 
Telecommunication Mrs. Oppah Rushesha (TelePost, September 1997) when she urged PTC to 
support government’s second phase of liberalization – ZIMPREST. It might also have been a 
capitulation to the Econet case in the court.
It is alleged that the PTC was privately negotiating with Vodacom (Private) Limited of South 
Africa for a cellular business partnership well before the Supreme Court ruling an indication that 
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government was not sincere on deregulation. The court ruling on the deregulation of the industry 
led government to speed up its tender process in search of a contractor for the setting up of its 
own cellular network. The tender for Cellular Mobile Telephone Services (CMTS) was awarded 
to Siemens (Private) Limited South Africa with government tender board approval on the 2nd of 
September 1996 (TelePost, January 1997). The contract was valued at US$24,204,928 and an 
initial capacity of 20,000 lines was installed in Harare alone and expanded to 70,000 lines within 
five months to cover major cities, tourist resort centres and the Harare – Bulawayo highway. The 
new  mobile  network,  NetOne,  was  launched  during  the  World  Solar  Summit  in  Harare  in 
September 1996 and in Bulawayo at the International Trade Fair in April 1997. Telecel (Private) 
Limited was awarded a second cellular licence and also started operations in 1996 while Econet 
wireless (third cellular licence) was only allowed to start operating in1998.
The opening  up  of  the  mobile  telecommunication  business  to  private  players  compelled  the 
government to commercialise the operations of PTC in order that it could compete on an equal 
footing with them. This is evidenced by the fact that despite having been spared restructuring in 
the first phase of ESAP government was calling on the PTC to support ZIMPREST as early as 
1996 immediately after the passing of the Supreme Court judgment against PTC monopoly.
In line with the demands of the ESAP, the PTC was commercialized in 1996. According to the 
then PTC Director of Corporate planning Mr. I.T. Chaza,  the objective was “to improve the 
quality of service of Postal and Telecommunications services” (TelePost, January 1997). In the 
year 1999 the PTC was unbundled and the following year, the Posts and Telecommunications 
Act was passed by parliament thereby repealing PTC monopoly and allowing other players into 
the posts and telecommunication industry. The Act paved way for the commercialization of PTC 
in the same year. The unbundling of the PTC led to the birth of four strategic business units 
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(SBUs) namely TelOne (fixed landline telephone operator), NetOne (mobile telephone operator), 
Zimbabwe Posts (Courier / Postal Services Company) and People’s Own Savings Bank (people’s 
bank). The fixed phone company, TelOne was registered under the companies Act in 2000 and 
launched on 12 July 2001. NetOne created as a subsidiary of the PTC in 1996 also became a 
stand alone company under the companies Act in 2000. To date these companies are operating 
commercially and the state is the sole shareholder of these companies. The control of the POSB, 
which was created by an Act of Parliament  on 1 April  2001, was transferred from the PTC 
ministry to the ministry of Finance which regulates banks. 
The aims of the restructuring project in the PTC according to the  TelePost of December 1998 
were among other things to:
a. Generate business growth by increasing telecommunication traffic and postal volumes
b. Improving productivity
c. Controlling and freezing of expenditure as necessary.
On unbundling, TelOne was directed by Government to inherit most of the debt from the then 
PTC because at the time, TelOne had the capacity. The Postal SBU (ZimPost) then had very little 
debt  and  NetOne  was  hardly  five  years  old.  Worsening  of  exchange  losses  over  the  years 
ballooned the foreign debt position.
There was a massive digitalisation programme for the entire network but this failed due to lack 
of  funding  and  a  general  stagflation.  Hitherto,  TelOne’s  source  of  forex  had  been  foreign 
financial institutions like African Development Bank (ADB), World Bank and Oganisation of 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  countries.  These  have  pulled  out  of 
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Zimbabwe altogether  because  of  the  current  sanctions  imposed  on  Zimbabwe since  the  late 
1990s.  This  has  contributed  to  the  inadequacy  of  existing  network  capacity,  network 
obsolescence and compromised the quality of Service (TelOne, unpublished paper, November 
2007). 
As  part  of  the  commercialization  process,  the  PTC  embarked  on  a  business  processes 
reengineering (BPR) process in 1999 to 2000 which was aimed at streamlining service delivery 
by reducing bureaucracy and adopting technological advancement. This was going to make it 
possible for the companies to do more with less staff. The BPR team comprising managers and 
staff members trained by consultant Coopers and Lybrand analysed all jobs to see which jobs 
were to be eliminated after which a voluntary exit package was availed to staff. ZPTWU the only 
union then participated in the process. Almost 20% of the workers took up the packages which 
saw the staffing level being reduced from almost 10,000 to about 8000. Among those who took 
up the severance packages were key union figures at different levels. This affected the union in a 
negative  way  as  inexperienced  members  remained  who  at  times  made  costly  decisions  for 
example  the 2004 strike (Interview: Gondo, 03 July 2009).  Participants  at  a recent  work on 
restructuring of state enterprises in Kadoma were shocked to hear that the restructuring never 
achieved its intended objectives mainly because it was a ministerial directive not based on any 
scientific  study.  The result  was a decline in union – management  relations  and a decline in 
service delivery and worker morale (TelOne unpublished document, August 2009).
Trade Unionism in the Posts and Telecommunication Corporation in Zimbabwe
Before 1970 the telecommunication sector was part of the civil service and hence the formation 
of  trade  unions  was restricted  in  line  with  public  service Act.  During  the early  days  of  the 
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General Post Office (GPO) the black workers had unregistered workers association like most 
industries at the time. The colonial government of Southern Rhodesia passed the industrial and 
conciliation Act in 1934 which provided provision that regulated the formation and operations of 
trade unions in the country. The ICA however, only allowed the formation of trade unions by 
white  workers.  The  Rhodesia  Posts  and  Telecommunication  Corporation  Workers  Union 
(RPTCWU) was founded in 1970 with the assistance of the Postal Telegraph and Telephone 
International  (PTTI)  (ZPTWU Education Manual).  PTTI was an affiliate  of the International 
Confederation  of  Free  Trade  unions  (ICFTU).  The  RPTCWU  was  black  led  and  operated 
underground as it had no offices due to the repressive colonial regulations at the time in the form 
of the industrial conciliation Act (ICA) which only recognized white led workers organizations 
and was meant ‘to emasculate black trade unionism’ (Sachikonye, 1987: 250). The union was not 
officially recognised hence its grievances were not officially acceptable thus it engaged in other 
forms  of  resistance  such  as  the  recruitment  of  freedom fighters  as  a  means  of  fighting  the 
colonial injustice. The hope then was that if a new government comes in, it will recognize their 
trade union rights. The amendment of the ICA in 1959 legalized black led trade unions which 
saw other sectors like the railways having a recognized union. However, in sectors such as the 
post  and  telecommunication  the  dominant  union  was  the  white  led  Rhodesia  Post  and 
Telecommunication Workers Association (RPTWA). Since the ICA operated on one industry 
one union basis, it followed that the black led RPTCWU was not recognized at law. 
The politics of ethnicity dominated the war of liberation in Zimbabwe. Quite noticeably,  the 
Ndebeles were in support of ZAPU while the Shonas were in support of ZANU throughout the 
liberation struggle. Even the voting pattern at independence in 1980 testifies this as Matebeleland 
was dominated by ZAPU where as the rest of the country was ZANU. Ethnicity politics created 
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serious divisions along those lines  in  society and in  the union movement  which made unity 
difficult.
 In 1973 the underground precursor union (RPTCWU) to CASWUZ split along political party 
and tribal lines as those from Matebeleland rallied behind Josephat Sibanda while those outside 
Matebeleland were led by Lovemore Matombo6.  This argument  is  supported by Raftopoulos 
(1992) who also argues that divisions along regional and political lines made it difficult for trade 
unions  to  merge  after  independence. The  Shona  speaking  workers  were  in  support  of  the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) while the Ndebele speaking workers were in support 
of  Zimbabwe  African  Peoples  Union  (ZAPU).The  union  was  split  into  Posts  and 
Telecommunication Corporation Union of Rhodesia (PTCUR) based in Bulawayo and ZPTCWU 
based in Harare. The two factions however, reconciled in 1982 at the directive of the Deputy 
Minister  of  Information  Posts  and  Telecommunication  Dr.  Naomi  Nhiwatiwa  who gave  the 
unions an ultimatum to merger or risk a government installed union (TelePost, December 1982). 
The two unions agreed to merge and form the Zimbabwe Posts and Telecommunication Workers 
Union (ZPTWU) in line with the government directive of one union in PTC a policy that had 
been adopted for all industries.
An interim committee was elected which guided the union to its inaugural congress held at the 
Monomotapa Hotel Harare on 02 March 1983. At this congress Lovemore Matombo and Dobba 
Gonye were elected as president and general secretary respectively. With the formal registration 
of the new union in that year all employees in the PTC were represented by a single union. 
6 Interview with Mr. James Gondo (CASWUZ Education Officer). He is a founder member of the first trade union in 
the PTC.
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The ZPTWU was the sole trade union for the PTC workers until the year 2000. The changes in 
the  communication  sector  brought  about  by  the  implementation  of  ESAP  and  the 
commercialisation  and  split  of  PTC  into  four  companies  led  some  within  management  to 
advocate for the split of the union as they felt ZPTWU had become irrelevant (although this was 
not  true)  hence  there  was  need  for  company  specific  unions.  They  deceived  workers  into 
believing that company specific negotiations would mean more wages and benefits to workers as 
those companies that would afford would offer favourable wages and conditions of service than 
others a utopian thinking as it later emerged. This advocacy for splinterism would only work in 
favour of management rather than workers for united we stand, divided we fall. Discussions in 
the Union pointed to the need for the union to cast  its  net  wider and recruit  membership in 
sectors outside the former PTC companies as long as they are in the communications and allied 
sectors. The targeted companies were cellular companies, internet service providers, transport 
and courier companies among others. This obviously meant a name change as well as change of 
the union’s constitution.
At the union’s 7th quadrennial congress held on the 4th of October 2002, the delegates to the 
congress adopted a name change from Zimbabwe Posts and Telecommunication Workers Union 
to Communications and Allied Services Workers Union of Zimbabwe (CASWUZ) in line with a 
November  2000  supreme  council  (the  governing  body  of  the  union  in  between  congress) 
proposal to that effect.  The congress delegates also adopted a number of amendments to the 
union constitution in line with the new dispensation. The name change meant the union could 
have membership from outside the former PTC companies but the union has unfortunately failed 
to do so. 
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The name change was a response to management’s call for splinterism following the adoption of 
neo-liberal ESAP by the government and the scraping of the one – industry one – union policy 
which led to the emergence of splinter unions in the communication industry. ESAP liberalized 
the labour market hence the emergence of the Telecommunications Workers Union of Zimbabwe 
(TWUZ) and the Zimbabwe Postal Workers Union (ZPWU) which were management backed as 
evidenced by the fact that they used company resources such as vehicles and accommodation to 
carryout union business a favour that had never been extended to CASWUZ. The rise of these 
splinter unions was viewed by the main stream trade union, CASWUZ as a strategy to weaken it. 
CASWUZ  allege  that  management  covertly  sponsored  the  splinter  unions.  However, 
management denied the allegations before the Ministry of Labour - (labour officer hearing) in 
Harare on 6 June 2001. Despite the attempts at weakening CASWUZ, its popularity did not go 
down as  it  maintained  its  membership  at  around 70% in  all  the three  companies.  The anti-
CASWUZ stance by management was witnessed at NetOne were the employer simply refused to 
negotiate with the union, preferring instead to negotiate with the workers committee. However, 
this did not mean the union was not in charge as section 23(1b) of the Labour Act (Chapter 
28:01) stipulates that 
If a trade union is registered to represent the interests of not less than fifty per centum of 
the employees at the workplace where the workers committee is to be established, every 
member of the workers committee shall be the member of the trade union concerned
Efforts  to divide and weaken the union did not succeed because union structures are  spread 
across the country as reflected in figure 3.1. It became too difficult for the splinter unions to have 
the same structure and attract the membership as their objectives were narrow (representing a 
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handful of workers as compared to the majority) as compared to CASWUZ which represented a 
wide spectrum of employees nationally.
Fig 3.1 THE ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE OF CASWUZ
Source: ZPTWU Education Manual
Table 3.1: Past and Present Leaders (CASWUZ)




















































1996 2002 Abisha 
Nyanguwo
Gift Chimanikire
2002 2006 Lovemore Matombo Gift Chimanikire
2007 2011
Lovemore Matombo Ronald. S. Musiwokuwaya
Source: CASWUZ
What has made CASWUZ such a strong union is the fact that it has been in existence for many 
years and it thrives on a wealth of experience as far back as the 1970s as compared to the splinter 
unions. Table 3.1 shows that the union’s current President Lovemore Matombo has been in the 
union  leadership  since  its  formation  hence  this  has  been  a  competence  for  CASWUZ.  The 
longest serving members of the CASWUZ are its current President Lovemore Matombo and its 
former General Secretary Gift Chimanikire which explains why they have been influential  in 
union politics and national politics. TWUZ’s secretary general Makore and ZPWU’s president 
Mberi were the proponents of division along professional lines with TWUZ representing mainly 
technicians and their assistants while ZPWU represented all postal workers. Despite management 
refusing that it had a hand in the splinterism project, some high ranking members of these unions 
confessed it  was a ministerial  project.  Despite this wealth of experience,  the Union educator 
Gondo argues that the loss of experienced unionists through the 1999 restructuring exercise had a 
negative  impact  on  the  union’s  decision  making  as  the  inexperienced  mostly  young  leaders 
miscalculated in going on strike in 2004. 




















1970 PTC 3000 525 2475 17.5
1975 PTC 4200 800 3400 19.04
1979 PTC 7500 2425 5075 32.33
1980 PTC 10000 4250 5750
42.5
1994 PTC 10000 5280 4720 52.8
1995 PTC 10000 5628 4372 56.28
1996 PTC 10000 5998 4002 59.98
1997 PTC 10000 6305 3695 63.05
1998 PTC 10000 6498 3502 64.98
1999 PTC 10000 6500 3500 65
2000




POSB 2400 2300 100
2001
TelOne 2750 2062 688
70.41
ZimPost 2400 1531 869
NetOne 281 135 146
POSB 500 448 52
2002
TelOne 2750 2071 679
73.86
ZimPost 2002 1500 502
NetOne 290 153 137
2003
TelOne 2750 2065 685
73.37
ZimPost 2000 1481 519
NetOne 290 152 138
2004
TelOne 2750 1100 1650
48.5
ZimPost 729 639 90
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NetOne 251 70 181
Source: CASWUZ Reports
The  oldest  union  in  the  communication  sector  has  passed  through  different  phases.  The 
RPTCWU was established in 1970 and it had a membership of about 17.5% which rose to about 
32.5% by the  end of  the  decade.  The  union  was  structurally  weak during  its  first  phase of 
existence due to the fact that it was not recognized at law and also the inherent ethnic politics of 
the time. The union adopted a name at independence to ZPTCWU and all unions in the sector 
amalgamated to form one thus the membership started at 42.5%. Despite this, the union was 
weak as government policy at the time was paternalistic and there was not much engagement 
with the employer  on issues to do with wages and conditions  of service.  By the end of the 
decade, the membership had risen to 65% and the union was now growing in strength especially 
after the 1994 strike. Although the 2000s started with a restructuring that reduced the number of 
workers the union members as a percentage had risen to over 70%. This shows how CASWUZ 
then had become strong over the years. A major drop in membership was in 2004. This was 
because of two reasons, firstly due to the dismissal of strikers and secondly due to threats of 
dismissal for those who continued to maintain their CASWUZ membership. This is reflected in 
figure 3.2. 
Conclusion
The chapter discussed the industrial relations system in the pre and post colonial state as well as 
the  development  of  the  communications  industry  from  the  colonial  days.  Trade  unions  in 
Zimbabwe have undergone a metamorphosis over the past four decades. During the colonial era 
of the 1970s the unions were structurally weak due to colonial regulations as well as the ethnic 
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politics by the liberation political parties which promoted divisions within the union movement 
which went on till independence in 1980. The control of unions went on after independence as 
the state created one labour federation out of the existing six and further adopted the colonial one 
industry one union policy a situation that prevailed until 1990 when ESAP was adopted. ESAP 
allowed for the deregulation of the labour market which meant many unions in one industry. In a 
way the resistance that came about as a result of ESAP created strong unions such as CASWUZ. 
Despite being a public sector union, CASWUZ along other unions opposed state policies and 
became unpopular  along ruling ZANU PF party circles  as they were accused of pushing an 
opposition  party  agenda.  Most  prominently,  the  restructuring  of  the  PTC  in  the  year  2000 
affected ZPTWU’s organizing strategies as other unions came into the sector. However, as the 
union changed its name to CASWUZ it proved to be the strongest union in the sector than others 
as it managed to maintain its membership above 70%.
Chapter Four
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Political Economy 1980 – 2004
Introduction
Zimbabwe inherited a dual economy at independence in 1980 due to the inequality between 
blacks and whites. The country had been under international isolation (economic sanctions) since 
1965  when  Ian  Smith  proclaimed  the  Unilateral  Declaration  of  Independence  (UDI).  The 
sanctions were however lifted at independence but the duality remained in place and the modern 
economy continued to exist in parallel to the rural economy (Kanyenze, 2003). The 1980s were 
characterized  by government  controls  and budget deficits.  State  control  of the economy was 
deemed critical in order to address past inequalities. Most prominent were the areas of education, 
agriculture and healthcare. Primary education enrolments rose from 1.2 million children in 1980 
to 2.2 million in 1989 and secondary enrolments rose from 74.000 to 671.000 in the same period 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1991: 1). Significant improvements were also noted in the areas of 
small holder farmers whose share improved from 0% in 1980 to 70% in 1989. (ibid: 1). Health 
care also improved significantly. Trying to address social inequality had problems of its own as 
in the same period the budget deficit was in excess of 10%, inflation averaged around 15% while 
unemployment reached 26% by 1989 (ibid). At the beginning of ESAP in 1991 inflation was 
around 12.4% and by end of 1995 it had short up to 25.81 a situation that prompted action from 
civil  society.  The  very  peak  of  inflation  during  this  period  was  2003 which  had  a  high  of 
598.74% while the GDP surged from 7% in 1990 to -2.4 in 2004 (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; 
Central Statistical Office, 2004). This chapter examines the changing political economy as from 
1980, how it impacted society and the character of the labour movement. The discussion will 
begin by discussing the political economy of the 1980s (pre-ESAP) before moving to the 1990s 
(ESAP) and finally 2000 – 2004 (post-ESAP) especially as it affected society and labour. This 
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discussion helps in the analysis of the research questions as to the cause of the unfolding events 
given the political economy that CASWUZ finds itself in.
Zimbabwe in the 1980s
The advent of black – majority rule in Zimbabwe marked the beginning of a new chapter in the 
history of Southern Africa. Kanyenze (2003) has argued that Zimbabwe inherited an economy 
which had the contradictory social characteristics as the rich and the poor lived side by side. In 
view of this the government in 1981 adopted the policy of Growth with Equity whose aim was to 
address colonial imbalances.
 Primary production formed the backbone of the economy with agriculture being the key sector 
of  the  economy  followed  by  mining  and  manufacturing.  The  importance  of  agriculture, 
manufacturing  and  mining  sectors  is  highlighted  by  the  fact  that  these  sectors  contributed 
approximately 50% of the GDP and employed about 55% of formal sector workers (Kanyenze, 
2003). The importance of Agriculture is highlighted by the fact that in 1984 it accounted for the 
highest  export  earnings  of  41% followed by manufacturing  and mining  with 32% and 27% 
respectively (Kanyenze, 2003). The majority of Zimbabweans lived in agricultural communities / 
rural areas (Sylvester, 1991) either as workers on farms or practicing subsistence farming. Its 
importance can not therefore be overemphasized to society. Madhuku (2001) has argued that the 
state used to set minimum wages in order to ensure the viability of the economy and at the same 
time protecting the vulnerable workers. The state owned such entities as the Grain Marketing 
Board,  the  Cotton  Marketing  Board  and  the  Dairy  Marketing  Board  which  were  critical  in 
Zimbabwe’s agro-based economy as a means of controlling agricultural output. Between 1982 
and 1985 the Transnational National Development Plan was launched with the aim of among 
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other things to improve food security in the entire southern African region.  Sylvester (1991) 
argues that  the objectives  were the same as those pursued during the UDI period.  The only 
differences being that in the same policies, government also pledged a land resettlement program 
in  order  to  address  the  land  imbalances  created  during  the  colonial  period  and  also  that  at 
independence policies were implemented to benefit the majority. 
Government adopted a mass education policy for all which saw its expenditure on education 
increase from Z$227.6 million to Z$628.0 million between 1979 and 1990 (Brett, 2005). For the 
first decade primary education was free, with fees being introduced in 1991 as part of the ESAP 
prescriptions. The introduction of free education saw school enrolments rise from 819,000 in 
1979 to 2,26 million by 1985 (Sylvester,  1991). Zimbabwe made great strides in the area of 
education and was ranked number two in Africa after Tunisia. Healthcare expenditure trebled 
from  Z$66.4  million  to  Z$188.6  million  during  the  1980s  (Brett,  2005).   This  increase  in 
expenditure saw about 450 projects of rural health centres being completed out of a targeted 
projection of 681 (Sylvester, 1991). This had positive implications on labour as more jobs were 
created  and  more  workers  and  their  families  could  access  healthcare.  Central  government 
expenditure trebled and increased its share of GDP from 32.5 percent in 1979 to 44.6% in 1989, 
while tax revenue increased from 24.4 percent of GDP in 1980–83 to 28.8 percent in 1988–91 
(Brett,  2006: 96). This squeeze on the fiscus created fertile ground for economic crises. The 
1980s were thus characterized by skyrocketing public spending particularly in the areas of civil 
service employment, spending on social services, drought relief, and subsidies for government 
owned companies which increased “from Z$155.9 million to Z$205.7 million in the 1980s (Brett 
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,2006: 96). The result of this was a chronic budget deficit, a high tax regime, and a rapid increase 
in public debt which had a negative impact on the economy (Jenkins, 1997. 
It is apparent from Brett’s (2006) argument that the economy was mismanaged in the name of 
pursuing what Jenkins (1997) termed Marxist-Leninist policies. Bond (1998) however, argues 
that the Zimbabwean government was never socialist as the alliance between the rural classes 
and  the  guerilla  movement  was  a  convergence  of  interests  against  colonialism.  While  the 
Mugabe  regime  might  have  been  genuine  in  trying  to  address  the  colonial  inequalities  the 
majority of chefs were also busy amassing wealth for themselves as evidenced by the many 
scandal of corruption highlighted in the 1980s and 1990s. In order to rescue the economy from 
further collapse neoliberal ESAP was adopted in 1991.
The 1980s were regarded as the best when we compare the pre-ESAP, ESAP and post-ESAP 
periods as it offered much for the worker and society. As much as 81.25% of the respondents 
said  they joined  the  PTC because  it  offered  better  wages,  better  working  conditions,  career 
advancement and job security. This agrees with what was stated earlier in the literature review 
when Prime Minister elect Mugabe stated that “basic wages and working conditions of black and 
white must be based on an equal footing” (Saunders, 2007: 161-162). The new government had 
adopted policies aimed at addressing colonial inequalities which saw it embarking on a massive 
recruitment exercise which saw the staff compliment in PTC increasing by 25% in 1980 alone 
(see  table  3.2).  This  was  necessary  to  expand postal  and telecommunication  services  to  the 
previously  marginalized  black  communities.  Good  salaries  were  meant  to  attract  and  retain 
skilled workers as this  was critical  for the development  of this  sector as indicated earlier  in 
chapter  three  that  experienced  white  personnel  were  leaving  for  greener  pastures  (Kenneth 
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Manyonda,  TelePost December 1998) . PTC was well paying as 56.25% of those interviewed 
said they had previously worked in the private sector while 25% had joined in from other public 
sector department and they all said they were happy to identify with PTC. More evidence of a 
stable economy and good wages was revealed from those employed in the pre-ESAP period 
(69% of the sample) of whom 81.8% said they owned hoses in the city. However, government 
policy of the 1980s was with its implications as the budget deficit had gone beyond 10% by end 
of 1989 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991) prompting the state to implement ESAP in 1991. The 
next section is going to discuss the political economy during the 1990s.
ESAP and beyond
The Zimbabwean government adopted the free market economy with the hope that it would raise 
investment  levels,  thereby  facilitating  attainment  of  higher  growth  rates  and  employment 
creation, and uplifting the standard of living of the majority of the people (Kanyenze, 2003). 
ESAP abolished subsidies, exchange controls and import licensing. However economic growth 
remained low hovering around 1.2% during 1991 to 1995, compared to the 2.7% growth during 
1980 to 1989 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991). Bond and Manyanya (2003) argue that ESAP 
failed to reduce the budget deficits which remained above 10%, while inflation and the trade 
deficit skyrocketed.
 ESAP cost the society in terms of social service cut backs and lost employment opportunities, 
something that the government later admitted and sought to legitimize its actions by blaming it 
on  the  International  Financial  Institutions  (Saunders,  2005).  ESAP  led  to  rapid  de-
industrialisation (textiles -64%, metals -35%, transport equipment -31% and clothing went down 
to -28% of production capacity between the late 1980s and 1994) (Bond and Manyanya 2003). 
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The drop in production capacity can be partly a result of persistent droughts coupled with misuse 
of SAP funds. Zimbabwe experienced food riots in 1993 and 1995 as ESAP induced poverty 
deepened. Fifty percent of the respondents to this study emphasised that ESAP was bound to be 
resisted as no one was consulted at its inception.  More so, all the respondents agreed that ESAP 
had  caused  suffering  to  the  working  class  and  the  poor.  It  was  during  this  period  that  key 
organizations  emerged  with  the  deepening  crisis  in  economic  production  to  challenge  the 
hegemony of ZANU PF (Saunders, 2005).  The student movement  and the labour movement 
were the two key organizations that came out in opposition to government policies. As early as 
1989, the students union had started opposing the government’s shift to neoliberalism when they 
denounced  the  Investment  Code  which  facilitated  foreign  investment  in  Zimbabwe  (Zeilig, 
2007). When ESAP was implemented in 1991, workers and students denounced it as they felt it 
had liberated employers and sacrificed workers; hence they coined 1991 the year of the people’s 
misery  (ibid).  This  came  out  clearly  in  the  interviews  as  well  were  62.5  percent  of  the 
respondents  vociferously  accused  ESAP  of  causing  suffering  to  the  people  through 
retrenchments  and  privatization.  Gwisai  (2002)  argues  that  the  three  groups  that  pioneered 
demonstrations  against  the  failures  of  ESAP were  the  middle  and working  class  along side 
university and college  students.  The point  being emphasized  by the respondents is  that  they 
wanted  to  be  involved  in  decisions  affecting  them  socially,  economically  and  politically 
however, government was not prepared to listen at the time. This is evidenced by the fact that 
ZCTU  went  on  to  draft  an  alternative  to  ESAP,  Beyond  ESAP.  Further  to  that,  the  ZCTU 
together with civil society went further to survey peoples views on social, economic and political 
issues in 1998 (Kondo, 2000).
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The same year a body advocating for constitutional reform the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA) was formed. The NCA comprised of civil society which included labour, women’s, faith 
based,  student  and  youth  posed  yet  another  challenge  to  the  ZANU PF  government.  These 
individuals and groups formed the NCA to campaign for constitutional reform because in their 
perspective the political,  social  and economic problems bedeviling Zimbabwe were mainly a 
result  of  the  defective  Lancaster  House  Constitution.  Hence  they  demanded  a  new  and 
democratic constitution (NCA website). This issue came out clearly in the interviews as 62.5% 
of the respondents unequivocally stated that their activism in the NCA was because they felt that 
President Mugabe has overstayed and therefore constitutional reforms were necessary to limit his 
term of office. A year later in February 1999 the National Working Peoples Convention was 
convened by ZCTU in collaboration with civil society and agreed to form an opposition party 
which was launched in September 1999 (Kondo, 2000).
 In response, the state became hostile to civil society such that by the mid 1990s it only engaged 
this sector if it could determine the agenda on its own terms (Saunders, 2005 and Zeilig, 2007). 
The state amended the Private Voluntary Organisations Act in 1995 which gave it the authority 
to seize assets of any voluntary organization, to remove its executive from office and replacing it 
with one of its choice and even setting the new salary levels of the new executive (Saunders, 
2005). The first victim of this callous piece of legislation was the Association of Women’s Clubs 
(AWC), targeted for its political outspokenness. However, the AWC successfully challenged the 
constitutionality  of  the  legislation  in  the  Supreme Court  much  to  the  chagrin  of  ZANU PF 
(Saunders, 2005).
Government also responded to this movement by heavy militarization of the state and its organs. 
President  Mugabe  unleashed  the  army,  war  veterans,  the  CIO  and  national  youth  service 
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graduands against his opponents and simultaneously also enforced discipline in his own party. 
“This  militarization  soon extended  to  the  state,  with  several  security  personnel  strategically 
slotted into senior bureaucratic and political posts” (Saunders, 2005: 141). Sachikonye (2009:2) 
argues that the “Office of the President extends from the cabinet to uniformed services, from 
ministries, to provinces and districts, from embassies, college campuses to villages.” PTC as a 
strategic state entity used by the state to spy on its opponents is one such organization which was 
militarized. Strikingly, Sachikonye (2009) argues that a recent estimate shows that one out of 
every five Zimbabweans has some connections to the notorious Office of the President7. This had 
serious  implications  on  the  organizing  strategies  of  CASWUZ and  was  especially  reflected 
during the 2004 strike.
As  indicated  earlier,  the  ZCTU  had  adopted  an  oppositional  stance  as  early  as  1991  when 
government implemented ESAP without consulting it but a decision to form a political party was 
only  mooted  at  its  1996 General  Congress  (ZCTU,  1996).  Although the  respondents  to  the 
interviews argued that it was CASWUZ that mooted the idea of an opposition political party, the 
truth of the matter is that they played a leading role before and after the formation of the party. 
Labour again played a leadership role in propelling the civil society to form a political party as it 
was the only effective civic  organization with grassroots structures country wide outside the 
ruling party. This is in line with the argument by Valenzuela (1989:447) as the labour movement 
occupies  a  special  place  among  the  forces  of  civil  society  as  it  has  a  greater  capacity  for 
extensive and effective mobilization at critical  moments.  The labour movement has effective 
network  through  its  union  structures  and  can  disrupt  the  economy  directly  through  work 
stoppage  unlike  other  civic  organization.  As  a  result  the  ZCTU General  Secretary,  Morgan 
Tsvangirai became the Movement for Democratic Change’s founding President.
7 The office of the President controls the state repressive machinery and intelligence.
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The fact that the ZCTU members saw the need to confront the class compromises caused by 
corporatism  of  the  1980s  gave  it  organizational  strength  as  most  previously  docile  unions 
especially in the public sector became active. According to Saunders (2005) this culminated in 
the wildcat, later organized political strikes of 1995 to 1998 which played a catalytic role to the 
formation  of  the  MDC in  1999.  The  formation  of  the  MDC was  a  result  of  government’s 
unwillingness to engage seriously in its own offers of tripartism.  In Zimbabwe, there are two 
negotiating forums at national level – the National Economic Consultative Forum (NCEF) and 
the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) which were launched in 1997 and in 1999 respectively. 
These bodies differ with South Africa’s NEDLAC in the sense that they do not have the backing 
of the law hence decisions made are not legally binding.
There are many hypotheses as to the cause of the crisis in Zimbabwe. Other scholars have argued 
that this was a direct result of the 1997 compensation and gratuities of Z$50,000 and a further 
Z$2,000 monthly payment given to former freedom fighters (war veterans) as compensation for 
their role in the war of liberation without going through the budgetary process (Makumbe, 2000; 
Saunders, 2005; Addison and Laakso, 2003). Initially the government had refused to accede to 
the  demand  but  the  war  veterans  under  Chenjerai  Hunzvi  were  like  a  tsunami.  Raftopoulos 
(2000)  argues  that  by  acceding  to  war  veterans  demands  caused  the  Zimbabwean  dollar  to 
crumble  against  the  world’s  major  currencies.  The  government  however  used  this  to  gain 
patronage from the war veterans who later become strategic for the survival of ZANU PF.The 
government tried to push the burden to labour but was resisted after a stay away.
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It  is  also further  argued that  the current  economic  malaise  was  exacerbated  by Zimbabwe’s 
participation  in  the  DRC  war  which  was  sanctioned  by  President  Mugabe  without  cabinet 
approval in August 1998 (Addison and Laakso, 2003: 462). Labour was generally opposed to the 
government involvement in this war (Interview Nhanhanga).In August 2000 that the government 
had spent US$200 million on the DRC war since 1998 which was viewed by the government as 
unsustainable. (Addison and Laakso, 2003). It is evident that the failure of government policy 
especially in the second half of the 1990s was due to unbudgeted spending such as spending in 
the DRC war which could have created the 44 000 jobs per year targeted under the Zimbabwe 
Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) also known as ESAP 2. 
ZANU PF changed its ideology in the early 1990’s.This can be linked to the fall of the socialist 
bloc in 1989. It is however, debatable whether ZANU PF ever really turned socialist given that 
socialist rhetoric lived side by side with capitalism up until 1989.  According to Saunders (2005: 
136 -7) this paradigm shift first manifested itself on the 1989 independence day (18 April), when 
President Mugabe for the first time did not talk of the Marxist-Leninist principles in his address 
to  the  nation  but  focused  on  “trade  liberalization  policies  for  the  sake  of  resuscitating 
employment  prospects.”  This  rhetoric  came  into  being  in  1991  when  the  government 
implemented  the  ESAP. “Government  with its  left-leaning  ideology had  taken power  when, 
world-wide, ideology was moving rightwards. This at least made the shift in strategy at the end 
of the I980s possible, even if it does not explain it” (Jenkins, 1997: 586).  Davies and Rattso 
(1999) argue that the key year is 1992, which saw the trade account fundamentally being fully 
liberalized.  “Output and investment contracted by about 8-10 %, the inflation rate doubled to 
above 40%, a consumption boom increased imports, and the trade balance moved into serious 
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deficit” (Davies and Rattso, 1999: 2). They further argued that the drought of the 1991 to 1992 
farming season also contributed to contraction.
In 2002 new repressive laws limiting  the freedoms of the media,  access  to  information  and 
persons in general were put in place. Coltart (2005) argues that the Public Order and Security 
Act (POSA) adversely affected the opposition’s ability to organize campaign meetings during the 
2002 election.  The Access to Information and protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) was also used 
to intimidate the independent print media, making it possible for the state to close down those 
media critical of its policies. Thus the independent paper, the Daily News was shut down in 2003 
(Coltart, 2005). Trade unions were similarly subjected to state harassment. The next section is 
going to discuss the changes in the communication industry and how the changes shaped the 
character of the union
Changes in the Telecom Industry post 1980
The telecommunication industry has been described as a strategic industry by both the colonial 
and post colonial governments. More prominently,  as reported in the  Herald of 12 November 
1982 and also in the TelePost of December 1982, the then Deputy Minister of Information, Posts 
and Telecommunication (MoI) Dr Naomi Nhiwatiwa explicitly said “PTC is one of the major 
concerns of the government. It is the nerve centre of its activities” (The Herald, 12 November 
1982  and  TelePost,12  November  1982).  She  went  on  to  explain  that  the  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of PTC was essential for social, economic and cultural development and stressed 
therefore that workers in PTC have a serious responsibility (ibid). The government therefore did 
everything in its capacity to make sure the employees in PTC were happy and they enjoyed good 
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wages and working conditions than other civil servants. This is explained by the fact that 62.5% 
of  the  respondents  said  they  joined  the  PTC  because  it  offered  good  wages  and  working 
conditions. More interesting is the fact that 25% of the respondents moved from other public 
sector departments to join PTC. The PTC pension fund also continued to make funds available 
for  staff  who wanted  to  purchase  houses  on  loan  without  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of 
position in company.  As indicated in the  TelePost of  April  1989, all  eligible  members were 
permitted to borrow money to construct or purchase a house in residential areas of their choice 
(TelePost, April 1989). It is therefore not surprising why 81.8% of the respondents who joined 
PTC in the pre-ESAP period said they owned a house. True as the MoI had stated at a union 
conference  in  November  1992  that  “the  union  of  this  corporation  must  have  as  its  basic 
philosophy, the general development of the nation, the improvement of the workers/management 
relations  for  better  productivity” (TelePost,  December,  1982)  the  union  maintained  this 
philosophy till the implementation of ESAP in 1991.
The PTC witnessed its first industrial action in the ESAP period in 1992 over a wage dispute. 
This  was a  sign that  the honeymoon of the  1980s was over  as  the labour  market  had been 
deregulated and they were now supposed to negotiate for their salary increments and conditions 
of service. As this was not a sector specific problem, this section will concentrate on two major 
changes that affected union/management relations during ESAP/ZIMPREST and beyond. In the 
aftermath to the management seminar on Corporate planning held in July 1994 there was talk of 
the  need  “to  steer  the  PTC  into  a  commercially  run,  customer  oriented  business  concern” 
(TelePost, Volume One 1995). In the following year Phase 1 of the Mashonaland/Manicaland 
digitalisation programme (MMDP) was launched by President Mugabe (ibid). Also in 1996 PTC 
added  another  strategic  business  unit  (SBU)  which  became  the  first  cellular  company  in 
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Zimbabwe. The new SBU was named NetOne and it operated under PTC until the unbundling of 
the companies in 2000. Digitalisation meant that the company was going to need less staff across 
the board and this paved way for the restructuring process in 1999. A PTC official in 1997 said 
commercialization was inline wit ESAP’s aim of Public Enterprise reform (TelePost, January 
1997). The interviews as well as CASWUZ reports (Table 3.2) revealed that the restructuring led 
to the shedding of about 25% of staff at its implementation in 2000. This impacted on the union 
in terms of reduced membership by 29.2% (Table 3.2). At the same time experienced union 
members  were also shed leading to the weakening of the union’s organizing capacity as the 
union organizer/educator Gondo said (Interview, Gondo, 06 September 2009). The other obvious 
consequence to the union was financial loss as union subscriptions were reduced.
The main conclusions of this section are that at independence the union/management relations 
were good because the sector was favoured by the state as it was considered of strategic national 
importance. This explains why it was designated as an essential service and therefore prohibited 
from embarking on job action. While the changes that were made might have been essential, they 
weakened the union movement by reducing its membership. The next section therefore is going 
to trace the union state relations post 1980.
Changing relations between the state and trade unions 1980 -2004
Sylvester (1991: 61) has argued that the terrain of political rhetoric of the 1980s was “pro-worker 
and pro-peasant.”The State President would announce salary increments every May Day while 
conditions of service were worked out by the Minister  of Labour. This meant  that  some the 
fundamental  tasks of unions were being performed by the state and unions relegated  just  to 
police the state declarations. Employers’ common law right to unilaterally dismiss workers was 
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curtailed  with the promulgation  of the Employment  Act  of  1980 and minimum wages  were 
introduced  through the  Minimum Wage  Act  of  1980 (Kanyenze,  2003;  Sylvester,  1991).  A 
comprehensive  Labour  Relations  Act  was  put  in  place  in  1985  thereby  allowing  collective 
bargaining,  dispute  settlement  and  the  registration  of  unions  among  other  changes  to  the 
industrial relations regimes.
At independence,  the trade union movement  in Zimbabwe was characterized  by deep seated 
divisions and was weak and this gave ZANU PF enough ground to control the union movement. 
This is evidenced by the fact that there were many splinter unions at independence and that the 
unions could not seriously challenge the government and employers on policy issues they did not 
agree with. There were six national labour federations and in the telecom sector unions were 
divided  along tribal  and political  party  lines.  There  were  two black trade  unions  in  PTC at 
independence:  the  Zimbabwe  Posts  and  Telecommunication  Corporation  Workers  Union 
(ZPTCWU) which  was  mainly  in  support  of  ZANU and  the  Posts  and  Telecommunication 
Corporation Union of Zimbabwe (PTCUZ), which was mainly in support of ZAPU. Likewise the 
trade union movement in the sector was split along tribal and political lines with the Bulawayo 
faction supporting ZAPU and the Harare faction supporting ZANU. The Harare faction was led 
by incumbent CASWUZ President Matombo and Dobba Gonye as secretary general up until 
1982 when government intervened. According to a report carried in The Herald of 12 November 
1982  the  two  unions  agreed  on  the  merger  under  a  government-appointed  chairman  and  a 
congress was to be held within six months.  Speaking at  the official  opening of the National 
Council  of the Posts and Telecommunication of Zimbabwe the then Minister  of Information 
Posts and Telecommunication Dr. Naomi Nhiwatiwa hinted that if the unions did not merger as 
per government directive the state will be left with no option but to install one. 
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These  entrenched  divisions  were  detrimental  to  the  creation  of  a  progressive  trade  union 
movement, an issue which the new government gave utmost attention. This was summarized by 
one of the respondents: 
We reunited again because of the government proclamation of one industry one union. 
The minister of labour at the time Comrade Kumbirai Kangai gave that directive to all 
unions (Interview: Gondo, 03 July 2009 and 06 September 2009).
Union  state  relations  were  cordial  as  trade  unions  were  viewed  as  state  appendages  and 
Schiphorst  (2009:  413)  has  argued  that  “until  1989,  the  ZCTU  was  in  varying  degrees  of 
subservient to the ruling party.”  The events that prevailed in Zimbabwe in the 1980s parallel 
what happened in Zambia after its independence as indicated in literature review that the trade 
union leadership was loyal to the ruling party (Larmer, 2008). This is mainly caused by the crisis 
of  expectation  as  the  workers  would be  expecting  much  from the  new regime.  Most  of  the 
respondents said they were happy with the industrial relations of the 1980s as the state was there 
to play the mediator’s role in many industrial relations matters. They particularly mentioned the 
state’s role in wage setting as good as well as the fact that the government will almost at all times 
listen to their wage and working conditions demands. However, things did not remain the same 
when ESAP was implemented in 1991 which they described with differing adjectives. 
Changing relations
By 1989, the Government of Zimbabwe was already pondering following neoliberal ideology 
(Saunders, 2001: 142). The state shift was announced in April 1989, when during the state of the 
nation  address  the  President  of  Zimbabwe  announced  a  paradigm  shift  from  a  command 
economy  to  free  market  economy  (Saunders,  2001).  Full  neo  –  liberal  ESAP  was  only 
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implemented in 1991 albeit with much resistance from the workers. The ZCTU and CASWUZ 
President gave an insight on this as he explained that the shift was caused by a failing economy 
hence government had to adopt ESAP.
ESAP was introduced into Zimbabwe with total disagreement from the ZCTU. In fact 
they also preached the fact that it was going to create more employment but none of 
those did the trick and in fact what we observed until now was the reverse of what 
ESAP intended to achieve (Interview: Matombo, 06 July 2009).
Matombo’s argument is supported by Gwisai (2002: 233) who argues that “between 1988 and 
1992, there was a radical leftward shift in key sections of the labour bureaucracy”, reflecting a 
tension created by the adoption of neoliberal policies by the government. This radicalization saw 
the 1991 May Day celebrations being organized under the themes (and placards) which lamented 
that “Employers Liberated, workers sacrificed” and “Are we going to make 1991 the year of the 
World Bank storm?” Gwisai (2002) further argues that the growing autonomy of the workers 
was demonstrated in the 1990 elections when they refused to endorse ZANU PF and as they 
instead tacitly supported a breakaway party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM).
 According to The Worker of March 1993 the effects of ESAP, such as the skyrocketing prices of 
basic commodities, increasing unemployment, and high inflation began to be felt by workers as 
early as 1992 to 1993. This is also confirmed by the fact that the first ZCTU led anti-ESAP 
demonstrations were carried out on the 13th of June 1992 and once again police broke up the 
demonstration (Saunders’ 2001: 143). The use of force by police represents a shift in the way 
state dealt with strikers post 1990 and also represented the changing relationship. However the 
interviews reveal that it was the PTC worker’s strike of March 1992 which opened the flood 
gates of industrial action in the neoliberal era in Zimbabwe. Most of those interviewed confirmed 
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that this was the beginning of a long journey.  ESAP also gave the ZCTU and its affiliates a 
chance to organize due to the fact that government, in a bid to protect its new agenda became so 
evasive and refused to listen to the labour movement.
We resorted to strike action because we said this government is not listening to us, let 
us push it to the wall or even form an administration which will listen to us the workers 
(Interview: Munandi, 02 July 2009).
Munandi’s sentiments were shared by all the respondents to this study who felt that by imposing 
ESAP on the workers the government had shown that it does not care for the workers and the 
peasantry moreso given that it  had caused unemployment  and poverty.  The former Secretary 
General of the ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai had this to say in January 1993; “The ZCTU will this 
year  embark  on  massive  campaign  to  mobilize  workers  to  transform  itself  from  a  largely 
vociferous organization that no one seems to listen to into a viable political force to be reckoned 
with”  (The  Worker,  March  1993).  This  statement  by  a  high  ranking  trade  union  official 
represented a shift from the leadership of the 1980s who were shy to be critical of government 
policy.
The implementation of ESAP generated considerable debate in the union movement especially in 
the public sector because state employees arguably bore the brunt of this turn to neoliberalism. 
CASWUZ developed  a  strong  political  critique  of  ESAP.  In  September  1994,  the  ZPTWU 
Supreme Council held a meeting to adopt a position following PTC management seminar on 
commercialization of the state owned company. Those present unanimously agreed that they will 
resist any efforts to privatise the company if that  will be harmful to the workers (CASWUZ 
Supreme  Council  minutes,  September  1994)  According  to  the  union’s  President  Lovemore 
Matombo  Structural  adjustment  followed  the  neoliberal  ideology  espoused  by  conservative 
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politicians  such  as  Margaret  Thatcher  (British  Prime  Minister)  and  Ronald  Reagan  (US 
President). In his view the main elements in this neoliberal programme were to give business a 
more central role on the economy (in other words, limiting the role of the state) and thus to allow 
market forces to operate without hindrance. Also, trade unions came under severe attack. From 
the union perspective ESAP was designed to  benefit the Western powers at the expense of the 
poor in the developing countries. Matombo argued that ESAP has created poverty to the working 
class  and  to  nations  in  the  developing  world.  He  criticized  African  governments  for 
implementing  SAPs  without  due  consideration  of  the  suffering  it  causes  to  workers  and  to 
society. For this reason, he believes Breton Woods Institution debts should never be paid back as 
this is tantamount to a waste of resources.
From the interviews conducted in this study most workers demonstrated some basic knowledge 
of  ESAP  and  often  had  first  hand  experience  of  the  negative  effects  thereof  such  as 
unemployment and crime. Most viewed the current political economy of the country as a direct 
result of ESAP.
The 1993 ZCTU May Day banner carried a message which confirms CASWUZ’s paradigm shift 
and further vindicates the fact that the ZCTU was not confined to shop floor issues but broader 
societal issues: 
ESAP is a ploy by International capital using ZANU PF to kill workers, peasants and 
Povo. No to price increases retrenchment and the CIO (The Worker, May 1993).
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The message on the banner reflected the growing militancy in the workforce. ESAP also affected 
the day to day operation of trade union as summarized by former General Secretary of CASWUZ 
Gift Chimanikire:
ESAP has also affected us as a union. The cost of facilities like hotels, transport, and 
stationary that we use for seminars, has increased drastically (The Worker, November – 
December 1994)
The workers responded by embarking on a wave of strikes and worker militancy. This can be 
viewed as a response by the workers to protect their rights from the negative impact of ESAP. 
This was summarized by the ZCTU and CASWUZ President8
It is well known that before ESAP, there were very few strikes and as from 1994 as I 
stated earlier on, when the PTC strike started, there also followed civil servants strikes. 
This was followed by ZCTU job action during the 1990s and subsequently in 2000 up 
to 2007.The strikes turned into mass action. The reason being that of poverty levels that 
were brought about by ESAP, affected workers and society and therefore motivated 
workers to mass action (Interview: Matombo, 06 July 2009).
From the  documentary  evidence  and  interviews  conducted  it  is  clear  that  CASWUZ  was 
embedded in society as they would consult other influential civic groups such as the ZCTU and 
the community residence associations. As emerged at one of the Supreme Council meetings in 
1996 where councilor Nhanhanga said as a union we have a duty to protect our brothers and 
sisters against harmful government policies…as we are the ones who will take care of them if 
the economy continues  to melt  down  (CASWUZ Supreme Council  minutes,  March 1996).  The 
concern about the unemployed brothers and sisters show there were some elements of SMU in 
CASWUZ as early as 1996.
Despite  successfully  resisting  the  first  phase  of  ESAP  through  lobbying  with  the  parent 
ministry and negotiations with their managements, the second phase of ESAP (1996 – 2000) 
8 Mr. Matombo is the President of CASWUZ and the ZCTU.
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reduced  the  workforce  by  about  twenty  five  percent  from 10.000  workers  to  about  7.500 
workers (see Table 3.2). At plant level it affected the morale of employees as workers were 
overburdened by workload. Other visible changes in management union relations as espoused 
by Matombo were summarized as
The relationship between the immediate superiors and the workers at plant level could 
somehow be regarded as autocratic and that did of course affect the morale of workers 
(Interview: Matombo, 06 July 2009).
Union-state relations continued to deteriorate in the 1990s, although, there were accusations of 
harbouring  political  agendas  for  example  during  the  1994  PTC  workers’  strike  these 
accusations did not carry any weight as there was no labour backed political party at the time.
A Turning Point for the Communications Industry
 In the 1990s the trade union movement in the telecommunication sector was one of the strongest 
in the country because of its militancy and ability to win concessions through bargaining, strike 
or the courts according to a majority of respondents in this study. The trade union was mature 
and effective in handling such issues. The Zimbabwe Posts and Telecommunication Workers 
Union (ZPTWU) is remembered for successfully carrying out one of the most effective strikes in 
post  independent  Zimbabwe  (The  Worker,  November-December  1994).  According  to  the 
Assistant  General  Secretary  Lillian  Mboto,  the  1994  strike  marked  a  turning  point  in  the 
communication industry as the union for the first time embarked on a three week strike.  Also 
speaking on the 1994 strike former ZPTWU Secretary General Gift Chimanikire has argued that 
the union managed for the first time to force the ministry of Labour and management to the 
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negotiating table despite them having vowed not to do so (The Worker, November-December 
1994).
According to the LRA parties to a negotiation have to try their best to reach a settlement without 
resorting to industrial  action.  It provides channels for dispute resolution such as conciliation, 
mediation, voluntary and or compulsory arbitration before engaging in a strike action. Despite 
these provisions, PTC workers were not allowed to go on strike as they are classified essential 
service. Chimanikire brags that the union managed to hold their first ever successful strike in the 
face of this draconian labour law. He explains that intimidation; arrest and threats that all the 
workers had been dismissed because the strike was illegal did not deter them from going ahead 
with the strike action (The Worker November-December 1994). According to a resolution passed 
after  this  historic  strike  during  which  the  General  Secretary  and  other  NEC members  were 
arrested for going on an illegal strike, the battles would continue to be fought on the streets and 
in  the court  if  the employer  continues  with his  unfair  practices  (CASWUZ National  Executive 
Council minutes, June 1994)
The 1994 PTC strike  was caused  by management’s  refusal  to  honour  a  1992 wage dispute 
referred to the labour relations tribunal wage award in favour of the workers according to the 
majority of respondents and also as carried in union documents. Management wanted to appeal 
to the ruling. This arrogance and failure to fulfill its part of the bargain and its concerted effort to 
cripple the union forced the workers to go on strike (The Worker, March 1994). The whole strike 
issue was politicized as the PTC spokesman Daniel Madzimbamuto was quoted in The Worker of 
March 1994 as saying “they [workers] are now fighting a war against the government and I 
won’t be part of it.” This implied challenge to the state by the PTC led former General Secretary 
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of CASWUZ to comment in  The Worker (March 1994), that  PTC management was deriving 
satisfaction from the suffering of the people (its workforce and customers). The CASWUZ led 
1994 strike was vindicated by a ministerial directive that PTC management should honour the 
Labour Relations Tribunal (now Labour Court) ruling.
The interviews revealed a turn of events whereby workers started to defy repressive state laws 
that almost embraced every sector as essential. In the 1994 strike, the interviews it emerged there 
was defiance from below because at one point during the job action the leaders tried to call off 
the strike with little success. This conforms to Hyman’s (1972:100) argument that trade unions 
can sometimes be used as a form of control as there is a high institutionalization of conflict in the 
sector.  The reasons for the defiance, was that the workers patience had run out given that they 
were striking for a 1992 dispute which management wanted to appeal. The workers’ patience had 
been stretched too far so they had to make use of their associational and structural power (Silver, 
2003: 3) as highlighted in the literature review. This confirms mobilization theory as postulated 
by Kelly (1998) as the workers had felt  that  management was being unjust by continuing to 
appeal against a wage ruling which was in favour of workers. 
This section revealed the changing relations of the state and trade unions from the paternalistic 
state of the 1980s to the authoritarian state of the post ESAP period. Many scholars have argued 
that the post independent state was pro-labour; however I would argue that this is not true based 
on my analysis. The state wanted to control labour because it was afraid it would turn into an 
opposition party hence trying to control at independence. Some sections within the ruling elite 
however unwittingly advocated for the adoption of neoliberal ESAP leading to the change in 
relations as revealed by the respondents to this study. The next section is going to discuss the 
emergence of opposition and the launch of the MDC in 1999.
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Emergence of opposition, leading to the launch of the MDC
Starting in 1996, the ZCTU began agitating for social,  economic and political  change in the 
country. This position was adopted at its 1996 congress and immediately it began together with 
civil  society  massive  consultations  with  different  stakeholders  nationwide  (ZCTU,  1996 and 
2000). This position presents a mirror image of what happened in Zambia as indicated in Chapter 
two where labour broke away from the ruling UNIP to form the opposition MMD. Schiphorst 
(2009) agues that it was the Unity Accord signed between ZANU PF and ZAPU in 1987 which 
created some press freedom and political space hence enabling the gradual sever of ties between 
ZCTU and ZANU PF. ZANU PF had done a preliminary assessment of ZCTU’s organizational 
strength prior to the implementation of ESAP and had found it to be weak. They were right as 
they managed to implement ESAP and retrench workers with little resistance from ZCTU (ibid). 
However the ZCTU was meantime creating coalitions of solidarity with other groups such as the 
student’s movement, public sector employees and the rate payers which gave it a stronger voice 
when criticizing state policies.
The wave of strikes that started in 1996 represented a gradual increase in opposition to the state 
and  a  turning  point  as  over  150.000  public  sector  employees  embarked  on  a  three  week 
nationwide general  strike (Gwisai,  2002 and Schiphorst,  2009). This was followed by health 
sector strike a month later in October and in both these strikes the ZCTU played an influential 
role (Schiphorst,  2009). During the health sector strike,  some nurses were dismissed and the 
ZCTU called  for  a  General  Strike  from 12 -14  November  1996,  which  although  it  flopped 
strengthened the ZCTU as it showed that it cared for all workers as the nurses were not affiliated 
to the ZCTU at the time (ibid). The study on the failure of the general strike pointed to the need 
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for  constitutional  amendment  hence  the  National  Constitutional  Assembly  was  formed  with 
Tsvangirai as its chair to advocate for amendments on labour law, electoral laws and governance 
which put the ZCTU on a precarious position against the state (ibid). Relations further soured 
when in 1997 the government introduced a war veteran’s levy of 5% on all wages in addition to a 
2.5% sales tax and petrol increases that had recently been announced hence the ZCTU called for 
a national stay away on 9 December 1997. Gwisai (2002) has argued that in 1997 alone there 
were fifty – five recorded strikes involving over 1.073.000, a figure equivalent  to the entire 
private sector at the time. As prices continued to rise, in January 1998 the country experienced 
food riots forcing the government to call for a consultative meeting with the ZCTU which it 
declined  but  instead  called  for  a  national  stay  away on  March  3  and 4  (Schiphorst,  2009). 
Schiphorst (2009) has argued that the success of the national strikes can be attributed to the 
deteriorating economic situation and the unbudgeted expenditure of Z$4 billion on war veterans 
which aggravated poverty as 61 percent of the population was living below the poverty line then. 
Also the growing membership represented by an increase from 150,581 in 1985 to 219,418 in 
2004 led to the success of the strike.
In trying to counter the ZCTU, ZANU PF created and funded a rival national labour federation in 
1998 the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions led by Alfred Makwarimba (ousted in 1985 for 
corruption  from ZCTU) and war  veteran  leader  Joseph Chinotimba as  vice  chairman  (ibid). 
However this did not succeed as ZCTU had become popular with the working class. In 1998 the 
ZCTU stepped up its efforts to organize public meetings to get views of various stakeholders on 
its  political  project  mooted on its 1996 Nyanga workshop (ZCTU, 1996, Kondo, 2000). The 
ZCTU got the mandate to form a political party and a National Working Peoples Convention was 
convened in February 1999 and an extraordinary congress by the ZCTU to resolve whether or 
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not to lead the new party (Schiphorst, 2009). The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was 
then launched on 11 September 1999 and in January 2000 Morgan Tsvangirai was elected its 
leader and gave up his position as ZCTU secretary general in February 2001 (Schiphorst, 1999).
CASWUZ  members  were  especially  enthusiastic  about  the  proposal  to  form  a  new  party. 
According to Chizura the question of forming a new political party was the focus of discussion at 
CASWUZ’s  1998  quadrennial  congress.  It  is  alleged9 that  after  some  debate  the  Supreme 
Council  agreed  that  it  was  imperative  that  a  labour  party  be  formed.  The  union  members 
interviewed believe that although there may have been such an idea to form a political party 
within the ZCTU, it could only have originated from one of the ZCTU affiliates. They argue 
therefore that it  was the CASWUZ (then ZPTWU) which mooted the idea and sold it to the 
ZCTU general council. Although this may as well be correct, the idea of a new party was first 
raised in the ZCTU in 1996, two years before the decision taken in CASWUZ. Respondents to 
the interviews remember that there was so much agitation from workers to form a political party 
whenever  leaders  came  to  report  back  especially  because  almost  every  time  the  issues  of 
collective bargaining were protracted. They especially thought if a new administration comes in 
it would be sympathetic to the plight of the working class which was now overburdened by the 
increase in unemployment and general economic decay as they were now taking care of their 
unemployed relatives. This appeal to workers that goes beyond the employment relationship to 
the totality of their lives, as consumers, citizens, family members and women is what Webster 
cited in Fairbrother (2008) calls social movement unionism. Unlike private sector workers PTC 
workers directly opposed the state as their employer and by agitating for an opposition party they 
were fighting two battles at one front unjust and protracted collective bargaining as well as a 
9 Minutes of the 1998 Quadrennial Congress meeting was not availed to this researcher hence this point is not 
backed by evidence.
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worsening  economic  environment.  PTC  workers  were  used  to  better  wages  and  working 
conditions of the 1980s as came out in the interviews and also as supported by the fact that the 
recorded  the  lowest  strike  level  in  the  1980s  (only  one  strike  in  1989  against  unfair/racist 
management – Saunders, 2001: 274). Naturally as these were removed, they did everything to 
protect their territory.
CASWUZ assumed a leadership role also mainly because of the high level of consciousness of 
its members as a result of the training sessions that were given to their members on trade union 
matters between 1990 and 1996 according to the CASWUZ organizer/educator Gondo who said 
they would conduct up to twelve seminars a year. Although these seminars were not political in 
nature,  they  enlightened  workers  on  the  exploitation  that  results  from  the  relationship  of 
employment. They therefore were conscious that they are the creators of wealth and as such they 
became determined to fight for their piece of the cake. This high level of consciousness coupled 
with the fact that ESAP had brought economic slowdown made the workers politically charged 
as Nhanhanga observed. Sixty three percent of the respondents to the interviews were of the 
opinion that the workers formed the MDC because they felt the current government had become 
so undemocratic and un-sympathetic to their plight and therefore was supposed to be replaced by 
a democratic party. This explains what was discussed in literature review that social movement 
unionism  emerges  “in  authoritarian  countries…where  workers  are  excluded  from  central 
decision making process” (Webster, 1988: 194).
Further, the CASWUZ Supreme Council agreed in October 2002 that it will offer moral support 
to its members who decide to join the MDC on condition that they relinquish their union position 
(CASWUZ 7th Quadrennial Congress minutes, October 2002). This decision to be in a political alliance 
has  been  defined  as  social  movement  unionism  by  Von  Holdt  (2002).  A  number  of  CASWUZ 
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members were directly involved in the formation of the MDC and occupied key positions at 
various levels. These included the former General Secretary Gift Chimanikire, who was one of 
the founding top five,  and the union’s lawyer,  Tendai  Biti.  Other unionists  such as Chizura, 
Gondo, and Munandi occupied positions at provincial level. However, there are many more that 
held other positions in the MDC structures as the union never took stock of who holds which 
position. Nyandoro argues that this meant CASWUZ became more influential in the MDC than 
any other union because besides Biti and Chimanikire there were many other of its members in 
influential  positions  throughout  the  country.  The  launch  of  the  MDC  heightened  political 
tensions in the country because for the first time there existed a mass alternative to the rule of the 
Mugabe regime. The leading role played by trade unions in this new political movement further 
worsened relations with the ruling party.  Currently three former CASWUZ leaders are MDC 
parliamentarians.
The interviews gave the impression that workers viewed a change of administration as a solution 
to their socio-economic problems, and the MDC was viewed as the most suitable replacement of 
ZANU PF party. Besides issues affecting them at work, the workers felt that they were being 
denied political rights as supporting the MDC was being criminalized and 87.5 percent of the 
respondents said they covertly supported the opposition for fear of reprisal by the employer as 
the workplace has been highly politicized. However, the fact that their union adopted a congress 
resolution in support of the MDC makes it difficult to hide their identity as these resolutions are 
passed on to  the  structures  for  execution  (CASWUZ 7th Quadrennial  Congress  minutes,  October 
2002).  The position  adopted  easily  gets  to  ZANU PF as  it  also has  its  members  within  the 
workplace  who  are  CASWUZ  members.  Despite  this  fear,  CASWUZ’s  emphasis  was  on 
“creative  pressure  strategies  include…direct  action,  community  alliances,  and  political 
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intervention” as argued by Lopez (2009: 9) in chapter two. This goes on to show how social 
movements  can  push  for  an  alternative  as  in  the  case  of  Zambia  where  the  Movement  for 
Multiparty  Democracy  (MMD)  came  into  power  through  the  combined  force  of  social 
movements (Larmer, 2002: 175).
Conclusion
The political economy of Zimbabwe has deteriorated to unprecedented levels since independence 
in 1980. In the 1980s labour enjoyed protection from the state as favourable labour laws were 
enacted and they enjoyed the state proclaimed minimum wages every May Day. By 1989, the 
state  moved from this  system as it  adopted neoliberal  ESAP. This  economic  policy affected 
labour and the poor. As the economic crisis deepened, workers, civil society, and the peasants 
joined hands in opposition to the state as evidenced by a wave of strike action starting 1996 
which led to the formation of the MDC in 1999. CASWUZ played a leadership role at the time 
as it was the only union that could carry out effective strikes because of the unity that prevailed 
in the union at the time. CASWUZ therefore proved that it is a social movement union as it 
worked with political  parties, civil society groups (NCA, ZESN among others) to protest the 
economic decay and authoritarianism.
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Chapter Five
Striking for Wages and Democracy?
Introduction
The 1994 strike at PTC marked a shift in the way the union organized because the economic and 
political  order  had  changed  fundamentally  as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  due  to  the 
government’s  adoption of  ESAP. Also,  the state  had become arrogant  and repressive  to  the 
extent that trade union input on economic issues was no longer tolerated. The implementation of 
ESAP led to the deregulation of the labour market which necessitated the changing of organizing 
strategies by CASWUZ in line with the new order. This change in organizing strategies will be 
analysed in view of the strikes embarked on by the union between 1995 and 2004 whether they 
were for wages or for democracy? The discussion also tests whether CASWUZ was transformed 
into a social movement union or not. The next section therefore starts by discussing the changes 
in trade union strategy.
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Changes in Trade Union Strategy (Trade Union Democracy)
Trade unions are some of the most  democratic  organizations in society usually embedded in 
society and driven from below. However, it is not surprising some of the time to find trade union 
leaders who behave as if the trade union were their personal property. The undemocratic nature 
of  trade  unions  was  revealed  at  the  formation  of  the  ZCTU  where  out  of  52  unions  that 
participated only 32 could be verified if  they actually existed (Schiphorst,  2009).  Schiphorst 
argues that decisions on union matters such as affiliation, mergers and breakaways were taken by 
one  person  without  consulting  the  membership.  The  first  leadership  of  the  ZCTU  which 
comprised Makwarimba, Kupfuma, Moyo, and Mashavira (commonly refered to as the gang of 
four) supported by Soko, Njekesa and Ndawana was accused of relegating ZCTU business to 
party and its  government  (Schiphorst,  2009).  Under this  leadership the union federation was 
highly centralized, with power residing in the national office rather than with the membership. It 
may be argued that substantive union democracy only came to the ZCTU in 1988 when Morgan 
Tsvangirai  was elected Secretary-General  and Jeffrey Mutandare as President.  Gwisai (2002) 
argues that this was so because the new leaders decentralized power by creating regional and 
district  offices  which created  an organizing  platform for  the militant  rank-and-file.  The new 
leadership also worked hand in hand with university students who also felt betrayed by ZANU 
PF’s  adoption  of  neoliberal  policies  (Gwisai,  2002).  The cooperation  of  students  and labour 
represented a shift in trade union strategy although, surprising enough, some unions (especially 
those in the public sector which had stronger ties with the state e.g. Municipality unions) did not 
adopt  democracy  when  it  was  institutionalized  at  the  labour  centre.  CASWUZ managed  to 
assume  a  leadership  position  among  the  ZCTU  affiliates  as  it  quickly  institutionalized 
democracy. Starting in 1990, CASWUZ also set up regional offices in all its five administrative 
regions to encourage participation at local level, a step which acted as a precursor to the success 
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of the 1994 strike. The 1994 strike therefore heightened the importance of workers democracy as 
regional inputs were to be considered on decisions affecting the workers such as conditions of 
service in addition to strike action. This is summed by the union president:
In all the strikes that we spearheaded we ensured we advised workers of any dispute or 
any pending dispute. We would take it right straight to the workers and after explaining, 
they would give us their decision. And once they give us the decision what would then 
follow are the ballot papers and then we go on strike. (Interview: Matombo, 06 July 
2009).
Also,  institutionalization  of  democracy  is  one  resolution  that  was  passed  at  the  National 
Executive Council meeting held in June 1994 in the aftermath of the first ever successful PTC 
strike in independent Zimbabwe  (CASWUZ National Executive Council minutes, June 1994). This 
shift in tactic was adopted after the leadership had seen that workers are the owners of the strike 
not the leadership. This came out clearly during the strike as almost all respondents concurred 
that efforts to get workers back to work were fruitless during the 1994 strike as they insisted that 
they would only go back to work when an agreement is signed. This was despite the fact that the 
leaders had been arrested for inciting strikers. This issue was elaborated by those respondents 
who were employed during 1994. The collective nature of decision making was also highlighted 
as workers had to vote for a strike as provided for in its constitution.  Articles 21, section37, 
subsection four of the constitution reads “the Supreme Council shall notify all the members of the 
Union its intention to hold a ballot not less than forty-eight (48) hours in the case of a strike ballot” 
(CASWUZ constitution). The notion of democracy is institutionalized as a constitution prescribes how 
strikes must be conducted. The decision for a strike solely rests on workers’ collective decision as they 
are kept informed of progress with regard to the negotiations with management.  Matombo claims the 
success  of  strikes  was  due  to  the  bottom-up  approach  adopted  by  the  union  and  argues  that  other 
organizations  such  as  the  ZCTU and the  MDC initially  succeeded  because  they followed  the  same 
approach. This concurs with Schiphorst’s (2009) argument on democracy as given above.
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Literature  reveals  that  the  ZPTWU  only  led  two  strikes  prior  to  1994  which  were  both 
unsuccessful because of poor tactics (Saunders, 2001). In the first instance (1989) the workers 
ended up receiving legal threats from the employer as well as from the Minister of Labour, John 
Nkomo, for breaking essential services regulations. The second strike was also unsuccessful as 
workers returned to work after five hours empty handed due to a ministerial threat. The union 
embarked on the 1994 strike without any particular strategy except that it had been agreed that if 
any of them is arrested no one was supposed to go back to work (ZPTWU Notice of Strike to 
workers, February 1994). This was aimed at defying the essential services clause of the Labour 
Relations Act.
ZPTWU shifted their tactic post 1994 to staying away during strikes10. The basis of this change 
in tactics was to avoid confrontation with repressive police as was explained in the notice of 
strike by the union in 1994 (ZPTWU Notice of Strike to workers, February 1994). This new 
direction that CASWUZ embarked on brought a new dimension to the industrial relations in the 
communication  sector.  The  respondents  interviewed  in  this  study  acknowledged  the 
cohesiveness that existed during the 1994 maiden stay away which was met with remarkable 
success. 
The union as a democratic institution used its structure to disseminate information and make 
decisions or formulate strategies on strikes as decisions were passed through consensus. Union 
leaders emphasized the need and significance of unity as captured in the maxim “an injury to one 
is an injury to all, but did not turn to violence against those who broke ranks with its actions.  It 
won broad support for its diplomatic engagement with non-striking workers as it did not harass 
them but attempted to diplomatically convince them to join the action.  However,  those who 
10 Interview with Lovemore Matombo, Harare, 06 July 2009. Matombo is President of the union.
86
worked during the strike were despised and often labeled as cowards by fellow workmates. But, 
unlike in the South African labour movement where strike breakers are commonly referred to as 
amagundwane (rodents) and are often dealt with violently, CASWUZ, relations remained cordial 
even with scab labour. 
The adoption of stay-aways represents a shift in tactics by CASWUZ in response to severe state 
repression  towards  the  labour  movement.  This  corresponds  to  Valenzuela’s  (1989:  457) 
hypothesis on the effects of the authoritarian regimes treatment of labor and its political allies. 
The Zimbabwean authoritarian regime fits into Valenzuela’s typology of syndically harsh and 
politically  closed  regimes  that  is  “exclusionary  of  worker  demands  and  intolerant  of  all 
opposition  political  activity”  (Valenzuela,  1989:457).  This  is  because  the  state’s  response to 
demonstrations is captured in the maxim “shoot to kill” and a corresponding repressive labour 
relations regime. This can be traced as far back as early 1988: Munandi11 argues that a member 
of the union was shot dead by police behind the Harare Main Post Office during a demonstration 
against  a  LRA  amendment.  Thus  the  stay  away  was  adopted  to  avoid  confrontation  with  the 
repressive regime as this could cost lives. However, this tactic has its limitations as staying away 
means that there is no one to police the workplace in case the employer wants to take in scab 
labour.  Such  limitations  were  felt  by  the  union  during  the  2004  strike  when  the  employer 
successfully replaced strikers with scab labour, mainly taken from the army. Had the workers 
been demonstrating outside company premises, they would have taken an informed decision with 
regards the employer’s action. It is however important to note that the adoption of stay away was 
not by choice but was a defensive tactic meant to minimize damage to members by a violent 
state.
11 Interview with Munandi, Masvingo, 02 July 2009
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The unions and members used informal communication channels to communicate tactics during 
the  strikes  to  circumvent  the  repressive  state  police.  Through  these  informal  channels 
communication  of  information  on  the  strike  was  apparently  more  effective  than  formal 
communication. Chivizhe12 argues that the tactics were ever changing and he says sometimes 
they would meet at an agreed venue during the strike to discuss the next tactic after which they 
would then go home. At times they would use what he coined the spider’s web whereby workers 
used the informal  network such as word of  mouth  and telephones  to  communicate  amongst 
themselves  up  to  the  last  worker  passing  the  latest  development  about  the  strike.  Informal 
network of communication was made easier by the fact that the majority of workers lived in the 
same areas.  They would only go back to work when convinced that an agreement  has been 
reached.  Although  this  seems  positive  as  the  respondents  put  it,  there  are  always  problems 
associated with being forced to take strike action outside the collective space of the workplace. 
Firstly,  the  strike  does  not  receive  full  media  coverage  which  helps  in  getting  local  and 
international solidarity as reporters cannot visit workers at their homes. Second there are chances 
that scab labour would be hired. Thirdly you will be taking work related stress home to share it 
with family and friends when you should share it with workmates. Lastly, the fact that the strike 
lasted for three weeks is evidence enough that it was stressful to the workers as there are high 
chances  that  had it  gone beyond this  period,  they were going to end up divided.  This  is  so 
because it was the first ever protracted strike and also because the tactic of staying away was 
being used for the first time.
12 Interview with Chivizhe, Masvingo, 02 July 2009
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In the more remote areas the strategy and advice to workers was to keep in touch with the nearest 
Post Office or Telephone exchange so that they would know the latest developments. This was 
confirmed by Matombo:
Well we would use the telephone basically. We are in the communication industry and 
we utilized our competences to our advantage. (Interview: Matombo, 06 July 2009).
What this meant therefore was that the telephone system was supposed to be kept working in 
order that communication would be maintained. The other reason for maintaining the telephone 
system working was also because the workers usually wanted to see a written and signed copy of 
the agreement, which would most probably have to be faxed from headquarters to all centres 
around Zimbabwe.
The union removed the organizing of the workers away from the workplace to the community 
where the workers lived and made use of social networks to communicate with the workers.
Those workers who reported for duty during the strike had to work or risked being dismissed in 
terms of the company code of conduct13. Munandi argues that this ironically worked in favour of 
the trade union as most workers would opt to stay away.
The  1994 PTC workers’  strike  had  far  reaching  consequences  on  union/management  (state) 
relations as the union for the first time successfully challenged state laws on essential services by 
enduring arrests  and defying threats  of dismissals.  They served as an example to other state 
owned  enterprises  which  are  mostly  classified  essential  service.  For  that  reason,  they  were 
accused of advancing a political agenda by the company spokesman (The Worker, March 1994). 
13 In terms of the code of conduct any absence for more than five consecutive days is a dismissible offence
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This marked a turning point as relations would almost be protracted from hereon because of lack 
of trust between the parties as will be discussed in the next section.
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Nature of strikes between 1995 and 2003
For almost a decade PTC workers have been going on strike over issues affecting them at their 
workplace.  Although as  early  as  1994,  PTC management  accused  striking  workers  of 
pursuing a political agenda (The Worker, March 1994), this is not so because then there 
was no labour backed opposition party. Also as early as 1995 the public media sought to 
portray the ZCTU as having political ambitions and “preparing to enter the political arena 
for the 1995 general elections” (Schiphorst, 427). While this prediction might have been 
partially correct for ZCTU led strikes, ZPTWU strikes were merely to do with bread and 
butter. However, after 1999 some of its strikes were of a political nature especially those 
that were ZCTU led. This section tries to analyse the strikes that PTC workers undertook 
between 1995 and 2003 in order that their nature might be revealed as it seems CASWUZ 
played a dual role of striking for wages and democracy as explained by its president who 
said during this period unions had become ‘silent assailants’. What this suggests is that 
because of the repressive nature of the ZANU PF government it had become difficult to 
speak out hence they covertly discussed economic and political issues at the workplace. In 
sum it had become difficult to express anti-ZANU PF sentiments at the workplace whether 
by speaking against or striking over whatever issue. What this means therefore is that the 
period 1995 to 2003 became a learning curve whereby it came out clearly that public sector 
strikes will always inherently be political as they are directly against the state or calls for 
its action. The next section tries to clarify this point by analyzing the changing causes of 
strikes over nearly a decade.
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The ZPTWU maiden strike of 1994 was the first time the union undertook a three week strike 
and most probably the first of its type during the decade. What is heartening though is that the 
issues that caused strikes in 1994 were all addressed. Also from the analysis they also became 
the causes of subsequent strikes. What therefore differs is the way the causes were addressed by 
both parties. The discussion that follows is based on information compiled from notices to go 
on strike by the union between 1994 and 2004.
In 1995, the union went on strike to press for a wage hike and at  the same time accusing 
management of being incompetent. Although the period taken to resolve the issue could not be 
ascertained by documentary means, the interviews revealed that there was a drastic reduction in 
the number of days that management took to address the causes of the strikes. This is more 
visible in the 1997 strike also caused by a wage dispute which only lasted for one week down 
from the three weeks of 1994. This depicts a massive reduction in management’s reaction time. 
There are three main arguments as to why management became receptive to worker demands 
after the 1994 strike. Firstly,  the parliamentarians had humiliated them in 1994 by directing 
them to pay workers who had embarked on a three week strike. Secondly the workers had 
become so united to the extent that management tried by all means to avoid the replication of 
the 1994 strike. Lastly, the sector was considered an essential service by the government; hence 
it was imperative that management address the dispute in the shortest possible time. This trend 
was reversed starting in 2000 as relations  with the state tilted in favour of management  as 
opposed to the workers, thus there was an upward shift in the number of days spend on strike. 
The strike was caused by a government directive to reduce PTC wages by over 50 percent 
citing financial constraints. The wages had been affected seven months earlier in January 2000. 
This  decision  was  not  popular  with  workers  and  it  worsened  worker/state  relation  as  the 
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majority of them were left heavily in debt. After a failed industrial action the union shifted its 
strategy to follow the legal route. The courts took too long to address the matter and an out of 
court compromise was only reached in 2003. By the year 2000, union demands had somewhat 
become political in addition to bread and butter issues such as wages. Now demands such as 
protection  against  victimization  by  war  veterans  in  certain  parts  of  the  country  were  also 
incorporated. Management had also become highly unreceptive as the other cause of strikes in 
2001  was  management’s  refusal  to  negotiate  with  the  union.  Most  respondents  attributed 
management’s negative response to strikes to the politicization of the workplace due to the 
perceived  alliance  of  workers  to  the  opposition.  The  ESAP induced  split  of  the  PTC into 
strategic business units (SBUs) might also have impacted on management stance on strikes as 
they desperately needed results not strikes. The transformation of CASWUZ from an industrial 
union to a social movement union became rapid. Around 2000 the union urged its members to 
vote  “NO”  in  the  constitutional  referendum thus  directly  opposing  the  state.  In  the  2000 
elections, the union further urged its members to vote for opposition parliamentarians some of 
whom were its members. In August 2000, the state cut PTC wages thus further transforming 
the  union’s  concerns  from  industrial  to  social  especially  given  that  the  employer  was 
unresponsive to the union’s request to protect its members from attacks by war veterans (Notice 
to  go on strike,  2001).  The delay in  solving the 2000 salary cut  dispute  further  worsened 
relations such that by 2003 a series of strikes were undertaken and workers were calling for the 
resignation of the entire management team. The union accused the managers of corruption, 
nepotism and what they called cowboy industrial relations mainly because management had 
withdrawn from the bipartite negotiating forum the National Employment Council (NEC). The 
majority of respondents in this study confirmed that some managers retaliated by flashing their 
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party cards and threatening that if the union continued opposing state policies they will regret 
their actions.
Calling  for  the  resignation  of  state  appointed  managers  at  the  time  of  heightened  political 
tension  like  2003 was tantamount  to  calling  for  the  resignation  of  the  state  itself  as  these 
managers  carry  out  state  orders.  Indirectly  therefore  the  union  was  pointing  at  the  state’s 
incompetence.  The  union also adopted the  legal  route  in  order  to  circumvent  the  essential 
services clause in the Labour Relations Act. Despite the union being victimized in 2004 and 
again  showing  the  loophole  of  the  legal  route,  it  had  played  its  role  in  fighting  for  the 
democratization  of  labour  regulations  and  constitutional  amendments.  A  summary  of 
ZPTWU/CASWUZ led strikes is given below. 
Table 4.1 ZPTWU/CASWUZ Led Strikes





Reasons for Strikes How Was It Resolved? Days 
on 
Strike
1994 1 10,000 Management’s refusal to 
honour a 1992 wage dispute. 
The tribunal had awarded the 
workers 13, 5% back dated to 
July 1992 which was 3, 5% 
higher than PTC 
management was prepared to 
offer. Management declined 
to make union deductions of 
Z$5 instead deducting 
50cents.
The workers were only 
paid their labour 
relations tribunal award 
after a cabinet and 
ministerial intervention. 
The workers had resisted 
threats of dismissal and 
stayed away from work 
for almost three weeks
<21




An increment was 
granted.
1996 *
1997 1 10,000 Disagreement over wage and 
benefits hike. To pressure 
management to accede to a 
collective bargaining demand






2000 2 8,000 Failure to implement agreed 
position – Management cut 
workers salaries by more 
than 50%
Management had agreed 
to implement the 
collective bargaining 
agreement as recorded in 
S.I 26 of 2000 but did 
not do so. It was later 
referred to the courts
>14
2001 4 8,000 Restructuring of 1999 to 
2000 and the grading system 
done in January 2000, which 
had unfairly graded other 
workers, victimization by 
war veterans especially in 
areas like Guruve in 
Mashonaland. Against the 
formation of a splinter union 
by the CEO. Refusal to 
negotiate by the CEO citing 
he is busy. Giving workers a 
10% salary increment across 
the board without union 
knowledge.
2002 *
2003 3 8,000 Failure to implement a high 
court order to reinstate the 
salaries cut by 50% in 
August 2000. Delay in 
agreeing on the name of an 
arbitrator for the 2003 salary 
dispute. Workers wanted top 
management to resign and 
new management appointed 
citing misuse of company 
property, corruption, and 
nepotism and cowboy 
industrial relations as some 
of the reasons. Workers 
wanted a substantive board 
because they felt the acting 
board was not doing a good 
job. They also wanted 
management to enter into a 
written commitment at the 
NEC to pay the salaries of 
2000 and on the current year 
The 2000 salary cut issue 
was solved as an out of 
court settlement. The 
workers lost out though. 
The 2003 arbitral issue 
was not resolved and it 
culminated into a series 
of other industrial actions 
in 2004. The other issues 
were also not resolved 
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since they had withdrawn 
from the NEC.
2004 6 4,000 Failure to implement an 
arbitrator’s award for the 
2004 1st quarter award 
preferring to take the matter 
to the high court by 
management - which they 
did. Arrogance during 
negotiations by management. 
Reducing their salary offer 
for example from Z$862,411 
for the lowest paid to 
Z$819,000 without 
producing documentary proof 
of inability to pay. 
Victimisation of trade 
unionists
The strikes resulted in 
the sacking of more than 
50% of the total 
workforce. Up to now 
the workers have not yet 
been reinstated despite 
efforts to resolve the 
issue through the courts 
and also politically.
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Source: ZPTWU/CASWUZ Notices of intent to go on strike 1994 to 2004
The next section therefore deals with ZCTU led strikes and the role that ZPTWU/CASWUZ 
played in these strikes. The discussion also tries to find out whether they were of a political 
nature or bread and butter issues.
ZPTWU/CASWUZ’s Role in ZCTU led strikes
Starting  in  1995,  the  ZCTU  started  to  be  assertive  on  issues  of  economic  policy  most 
prominently through the beyond ESAP project which sought to explain the dark side of ESAP to 
the  workers  and  society  and  “what  the  ZCTU  is  proposing  as  an  alternative  strategy  for 
development” (Kanyenze, 1996: 11). In the same year, the ZCTU also started working together 
with sections of civil society on issues of national policy making (ZCTU, 1995). The first real 
action by the ZCTU was in 1996 when in August and September it supported civil servants who 
had gone on strike and its General Strike in November in support of civil servants who were not 
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members of the ZCTU then (Schiphorst,  2009). The strike failed but nevertheless shaped the 
character of the ZCTU as by 1997 it started agitating for issues to do with democracy (ibid). The 
ZCTU organized several stay-aways against the deteriorating economic climate and the dearth in 
democracy  since  then  but  as  Schiphorst  (2009:  434)  has  argued  this  was  met  with  “harsh 
repression, continuous intimidation, arrests and outlawing of meetings.” During this period, the 
ZPTWU/CASWUZ played  a  central  role  as  its  members  and non-members  pledged  a  “100 
percent” unwavering support of the stay-aways (Saunders, 2001: 279)
The interview with the CASWUZ/ZCTU President Matombo shed more light as to the causes of 
ZCTU led strikes post 1999 as centering on three main areas namely high taxation, access to 
antiretroviral drugs and the worsening economic crisis. This issues that CASWUZ partook were 
not economic ones but rather  social  ones. Matombo further  elaborates  the CASWUZ – state 
relations when he says;
Look, this is a state owned enterprise and any strike is misconstrued to mean that we are 
against the state (Interview: Matombo, 06 July 2009).
This statement by the union President seems to suggest that it is difficult to distinguish between 
pure industrial and political strikes especially in the public sector, and more so in the case of 
Zimbabwe where the state is ultra-sensitive about criticisms.  Therefore,  even pure bread and 
butter strikes are deliberately accused as being political, partly to discredit the workers’ actions. 
Some respondents were ambivalent  on the nature of strikes as they highlighted the cause as 
political and economic mismanagement by the ZANU PF government as the problem during the 
pre-interview discussions only to argue that the cause was bread and butter issues during the 
interview session. This can be understood as a cultural  tendency of  kusvisa or  kupota (being 
secretive)  as  most  Zimbabweans  tend  to  speak-out  in  a  meandering  manner.  This  tendency 
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makes it difficult also to put a dividing line between politics and bread and butter issues as most 
respondents argued. More importantly as Nyamupinga argued;
It is difficult to demarcate. If I say I want a living wage is it not politics? It is politics, 
because politics involves the day to day running of my life, that is politics to me. So 
there is no way I am going to say I am not in politics because politics does not involve 
being in a party structure but as a worker whenever I open my mouth, I am speaking 
politics.
This is testimony that the union members were aware of the fact that the organization was being 
transformed into a social movement union due to the political nature of some of its struggles 
(Von Holdt, 2002). The clash between the state and the workers is elaborated by Chivizhe who 
recalls the former provincial governor of Masvingo cautioning public sector workers that;
…if you are a civil servant and you support ZANU PF you are apolitical but if you are a 
civil servant and you support MDC, you are being political (Interview: Chivizhe, 02 
July 2009).
The effect of this statement is that it had become very difficult for public sector employees to 
embark on industrial action especially where they were perceived to be anti-ZANU PF as the 
strike would be used to discredit their cause. This is supported by Gomba14’s argument that the 
politicization  of  the  workplace  meant  that  those  who dare  went  on  strike  ended  up  being 
labeled MDC.
Political struggles
According to Beckman and Sachikonye (2005), by the year 2000, Zimbabwean economy had 
contracted by as much as 40 percent and the GDP per capita was estimated to be down 
to the 1953 levels.  The Central  Statistical  Office (CSO, 2007) figures on inflation 
14 Interview, Innocent Gomba, Mutare, 10 July 2009
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indicated that the figure was at  1730 percent,  the highest  in the world at  the time 
meaning that wages were rapidly eroded. Bargaining became very difficult given the 
rising unemployment figures. The collapse of the economy caused unemployment to 
soar and in 2000 alone 550,000 jobs were lost because of the crisis. At that point, the 
official unemployment rate stood at 50%. This had a negative impact on Zimbabwean 
workers and those in the communication sector were hard hit by the economic crisis.
The poverty datum line (PDL) was Z$700,000 which was way above what most workers were 
earning  (Consumer  Council  of  Zimbabwe (CCZ),  2007),  including  workers  in  the 
communications  industry.  As  a  result  there  were  more  than  six  industrial  actions 
pushing for wage hikes. A report carried in the  Zimbabwe Standard of 12 October 
2003 indicated that the ZCTU was organizing to call for nationwide demonstrations 
ahead  of  the  2004  National  Budget  presentation  to  protest  against  high  taxation, 
inflation and the general economic decay. Under these conditions, many workers were 
forced to resort to moonlighting or had to survive from remittances from relatives and 
friends  working  abroad  or  had  to  engage  in  other  informal  sector  activities  to 
supplement their meager wage or worse still they had to survive through other illegal 
means as one respondent Gatya had to say mbudzi inodya payakasungirirwa. Literally 
interpreted it means a goat survives by grazing on the grass around it that is workers 
survived by using the employers’  property like  cars,  faxes,  phones  and computers 
among others for their personal gains.
These economic hardships also worsened worker/state relations as pointed out in the interviews 
more explicitly by Nhanhanga 
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The government would not listen to workers requests for a wage increase and also the 
request for it to look into price increases so the only solution was for it to be replaced by 
a labour sensitive regime.
Nhanhanga’s comments concur the ZCTU President’s commented after a General Strike against 
the economic strike, high personal taxation and human rights abuses that demonstrations were 
the only way to force the state to take action (Zimbabwe Standard,  12 October 2003). Most 
respondents  interviewed  they  participated  in  ZCTU led  strikes  that  were  political  in  nature 
encompassing such issues as rule of law confirming the comments from the President. Gomba 
sheds more light when he says;
ZCTU led strikes were however, political in nature because they included such issues as 
the rule of law, good governance, the constitution, in fact all issues affecting society and 
workers (Interview: Gomba, 10 July 2009).
If it is true that organizations are shaped by their leaders, then no doubt the leadership of its 
President  Matombo  and  General  Secretary  Chimanikire  shaped  the  organisation’s  political 
thinking as they believed that labour has a role to speak for the voiceless in society.  This is 
demonstrated by the fact that respondents were able to demonstrate a high level of consciousness 
on the limits of management for instance as argued by Gomba;
I want to reiterate that the state is the major culprit in all our problems because it does 
not abide by the rules of law – the same laws that it enacts. Government intervention 
has been our problem because even if we agree on issues with the management the state 
comes in and reverses the agreements (Interview: Gomba, 10 July 2009).
Under  these  circumstances,  the  workers  were  bound  to  be  in  opposition  to  state  policies. 
According  to  Chivizhe,  the  state  attempted  to  undermine  the  support  of  union  leaders  by 
accusing them of operating underhand.
I think workers have constitutional right to join politics and to represent people at any 
level in politics…but like I was explaining that the minister was saying you are workers 
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during the day and politicians during the night he was not saying politician of the ruling 
party but politicians of the opposition party (Interview: Chivizhe, 02 July 2009).
Despite the minister’s concern, the workers continued to support political parties of their choice 
as this is their constitutional right. Within the ZCTU the workers advocated for constitutional 
amendment starting 1997 according to Schiphorst (2009) first with an interest on labour law 
amendments  which  was  then  expanded  to  issues  of  democracy.  This  reinforces  Matombo’s 
argument that 
Thus, ZCTU mooted, various strategies for political consciousness, for example they 
would then demand for a new constitution, which constitution was supposed to limit the 
president’s  term  of  office  to  ten  years.  Because  there  was  a  feeling  that  President 
Mugabe had over stayed and therefore the National  Constitutional  Assembly led by 
Morgan Tsvangirai was formed (Interview: Matombo, 06 July 2009).
PTC workers covertly fought the political battles and by 2004, their employer was tired of the so 
called bread and butter strikes and as a result more than half the workers were dismissed for 
going on industrial action. The discussion shall then turn on to this strike.
The 2004 Strike: a turning point?
The  sacking  of  PTC successor  companies  (TelOne,  NetOne  and  ZimPost)  workers  by  their 
employer (Government of Zimbabwe) came as a surprise to the working class in Zimbabwe. No 
one had anticipated such action could ever succeed given the unity that had prevailed among the 
workers for a period spanning over a decade. 
Due to the hyper-inflationary environment which obtained in Zimbabwe, NetOne workers and 
management signed a Collective Bargaining Agreement on 3 December 2003 to negotiate on 
quarterly basis. Efforts to do negotiations for the first quarter (January – March) did not succeed 
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despite efforts by the workers committee to initiate them. During the second quarter on 20 May 
2004 the union applied for a fourteen day notice for their intention to go on strike as provided for 
in the Labour Act (Chapter 28:01). The major reason for taking job action by NetOne employees 
was that management was refusing to convene meetings for the second quarter CBA as agreed 
on the  CBA of  3  December  2003.  Management  was  also  forcing the  workers  committee  to 
negotiate without the authority of CASWUZ as provided for in the Labour Act to which the 
workers were objecting. On the lapse of the fourteen day notice on 2 June 2004 the Ministry of 
Labour did not call the parties to conciliatory meetings as expected. The employer, in a desperate 
bid  to  stop the  industrial  action  forced the  workers’  committee  to  the negotiating  table  and 
threatened them with dismissal if they refused. The workers’ committee succumbed to the threats 
but  only  found out  that  they  were  to  negotiate  with  the  Permanent  Secretary  of  the  parent 
Ministry of Transport and Communication. Due to intimidation during collective bargaining, all 
members of the workers committee resigned which caused all workers to immediately go on 
strike.  Starting 24 June 2004 NetOne management  started to issue all  strikers with letters  of 
suspension citing that they were absent from work for more than four days which is a dismissible 
offence according to Statutory instrument 130 of 2004. However since this was an industrial 
action, it was supposed to be dealt with according to section 106 of the Labour Act which brings 
both parties before the Ministry of Labour to explain their reasons for their respective actions. 
Despite wining the case in the lower courts, the Supreme Court overturned these decisions and 
upheld the dismissal decision. (Case no. SC 89/05).
Like at NetOne, TelOne and ZimPost registered their disputes in the first quarter of year 2004. 
According  to  the  Managing Director’s  Circular  number  3  of  2004 a  dispute  at  TelOne was 
registered  as  early  as  February 2004 and the matter  was  referred ‘for voluntary arbitration.’ 
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ZimPost  and  CASWUZ  also  declared  a  deadlock  on  the  12th of  March  2004  after  five 
unsuccessful meetings. The case was also referred for arbitration which the workers won on the 
21st of  May  2004  (CASWUZ  Court  Papers,  2004).  ZimPost  and  TelOne  both  refused  to 
implement  the  arbitration  award  citing  ambiguity  but  ZimPost  later  changed  the  reason  to 
financial incapacity. In the meantime, there had been simmering signs of discontentment within 
the workforce as evidenced by the fact that there were unsanctioned protests at both ZimPost and 
TelOne mid 2004 as workers had not been awarded and wage increase because of the pending 
dispute. Meanwhile according to a 14 day Notice to go on strike issued by CASWUZ soon after 
deadlocked negotiations with ZimPost management over the issue and dated 7 June 2004 the 
union was to embark on job action as management had failed to provide documentary proof of 
financial incapacity. Two months later, on 27 August 2004 CASWUZ also issued another 14 day 
notice  to  TelOne  management  which  had  applied  to  the  high  court  to  have  the  arbitration 
nullified. Management also had refused to heed verbal instructions from the parent ministry to 
pull the case out of the courts for an out of court settlement according to CASWUZ. Instead on 8 
September 2004 TelOne management urged workers “to continue to discharge their duties while 
we await waiting for the Court process to take its course” (Managing Director Circular No. 15 of 
2004).
However, this all seems a well crafted strategy by the employer which the workers walked into 
and it threatened the existence of the union. A series of meetings initiated by the union were held 
between 18 June 2004 and 05 October 2004 to try and prevent strike action. These were to no 
avail as management instead reduced their offer from Z$862,461 to Z$819,000 triggering a strike 
on the 6th of October 2004. It is clear that the employers were anticipating this action and had 
prepared  responses  by  utilizing  different  parts  of  the  labour  laws  to  their  advantage.  The 
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company code of conduct stipulates that all collective disputes shall be dealt with according to 
the provisions of the Labour Act chapter 28:01. However management in TelOne went on to use 
the code of conduct while the ZimPost and NetOne the employers used statutory instrument 130 
0f 2004 where they should have used the Labour Act and dismissed more than fifty percent of 
the workers through improperly constituted hearings (Judgments SC 89/05, SC 26/06 and SC 
23/09). The Labour Act provides for the two parties to present their reason (show cause order – 
section 106 LRA) for taking their respective actions and where the workers are at fault they are 
told to go back to work (disposal order – section 107 LRA). The TelOne Managing Director 
Circular Number 16 of 2004 issued on 11 October and called on all workers to return to work 
by13 October or face disciplinary action. The same action was initiated at ZimPost. This divided 
workers as some returned to work and some did not. The union immediately sought meetings 
with the two managements to call off the strike but the meetings did not bear any fruit. This is 
when the union discovered that a political solution was needed and they approached the parent 
ministry to no avail  (CASWUZ Letter  to the permanent secretary,  28 October 2004). On 12 
November 2004, the union wrote to The Speaker of Parliament in respect of the matter who then 
referred them to the Minister of Policy Implementation. The union was granted audience but this 
did not help the situation.
The circumstances behind the dismissals are clouded with suspicion as interviews point out that 
this was a well planned move due to the fact that soldiers were used as scab labour. This report is 
supported by an article carried in the  Zimbabwe Standard of November 2004. The use of the 
army to replace strikers shows how the state was determined not only to end the current strike 
but to permanently dislodge CASWUZ. The Member of Parliament and CASWUZ member Mr. 
Samuel Khumalo has recently added his voice on the 2004 strike in parliament were he pointed 
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out that the PTC workers were dismissed because they were considered to be advancing an MDC 
agenda (Parliamentary  debates,  16 December  2008).  The union President  recently  urged the 
MDC to  initiate  a  political  decision  to  reinstate  2,135  TelOne and Postal  service  dismissed 
workers (http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk ). The voice by the MP and the president was shared 
by most respondents who said they were dismissed because of their perceived MDC support.
We used to hold our strikes the same dates as ZCTU called stay-aways…now I think 
that’s why they dismissed workers in 2004 (Interview: Gondo, 06 September 2009)
Most shop stewards interviewed were unhappy with the leadership’s lack of foresight as they 
claimed that they witnessed the training of soldiers who were to take up workers positions in 
the event of a strike but allowed the strike to continue. They argued that the leaders should have 
made a tactical withdrawal until such time the environment was conducive. Some respondents, 
especially shop stewards felt that the union leaders had not been democratic this time around 
because they were fighting another war with ZimPost management which had earlier in the 
year  suspended  four  key  union  executives  on  grounds  of  inciting  workers  and  the  union 
President had also been suspended for attending a trade union congress. According to a union 
circular released on 20 April 2004 the union Supreme Council had made a resolution that if the 
four are not re-instated “the Union will embark on a nationwide” strike action. Sections within 
the union leadership who had not been suspended saw this as an opportunity to get to the top. 
When a decision to embark on strike action was taken there were serious divisions as one of the 
Vice Presidents  from Eastern region was urging workers not to go on strike.  According to 
Jeranyama there were disagreements within the union leadership and as such Eastern region 
which used to be first to go on strike did not do so. This strike seriously affected the character 
and strategies of the union as to date there have not been attempts to go on strike. Chivizhe 
observed that;
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When we went on strike, the soldiers came and took the positions of those who were on 
strike and they have been working in those positions up until 2007, I think, maybe some 
positions are still being occupied by the solders up to now (Interview: Chivizhe, 02 July 
2009). 
The sight of soldiers (clad in military uniforms) on company premises was too terrifying for the 
poor  workers  some of  whom quickly returned to  work and the  division  that  followed gave 
management an upper hand when dealing with those who had continued with the strike. This 
conforms to Saunders (2005) observation of the militarization of state enterprises. Several union 
members  were  arrested  for  picketing  and  threatened  with  violence  because  of  their  known 
support for the MDC (http://webfusion.ilo.org/). These state agents made sure that CASWUZ 
would not unionise, as they, working with management intimidated those that remained at work 
saying if they continue subscribing to CASWUZ they would be dismissed as their union was 
linked to the opposition. The result was a 21,87% drop in union membership in 2004 as depicted 
in table 3.2 thus nearly suffocating the union as it ran out of finance. Some more strong union 
members were unilaterally dismissed even when they had not participated in the job action as 
argued by Jeranyama that he was victimized because he was an active union member;
I also did not go on strike but I was victimized by the then Regional Manager for being 
an active union member. So he did this by way of ordering the security guard not to 
allow me into my workplace. But I have got all the evidence to show that I was at work, 
and those I was working with, they are still at work. But the reason that I was an active 
union member, they victimised me, and they fired me (Interview: Jeranyama, 30 June 
2009).
Jeranyama and many others tried to challenge their dismissal individually in the courts but they 
were told by the court officials this is a hands off case. 
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When I tried to confront the courts with the case, I was told that this issue, it’s a hot 
issue, just leave it like that,  so I had nowhere to go (Interview: Jeranyama, 30 June 
2009).
The interviews have reflected that the workplace has been highly politicized as managements 
have adopted a pro-ZANU PF stance thus compromising the work relationship. A cloud of fear, 
mistrust and division has been hovering over CASWUZ members over the past five years. This 
is captured in the interviews which reflect dismay at the way the Supreme Court overturned the 
judgments (Judgment No. SC 89/05 - NetOne, Judgment No. SC 26/06 – TelOne and Judgment 
No. 23/09 - ZimPost) which had been favourable to workers. Jeranyama lamented that;
We feel there was government intervention in 2004 as a way of neutralizing the union 
which had become too militant…we read much from the Supreme Court judgments that 
set  aside  the  rulings  of  the  lower  courts  which  were  favourable  to  us  (Interview: 
Jeranyama, 30 June 2009) . 
 The interview findings are buttressed by the recent comments by the union’s president that the 
dismissals were a ZANU (PF) grand plan to destroy the workers’ union which was perceived as 
militant  and  a  threat  to  President  Robert  Mugabe’s  autocratic  rule  (The  Zimbabwean,  11 
September 2009). Do we therefore say the 2004 strike has proved to be a turning point for the 
communications workers given that since 2004 there hasn’t been any CASWUZ led industrial 
action in the communications sector? In 2006 one Regional Administration Officer had this to 
say;
History tells me that there is a former Regional Manager of this region whom workers 
demonstrated against. We thought the strike (2004) had taken away the stuffs with that 
kind of behavior but the latest developments have shown that we still have the remnants 
and TelOne should send a bold message, that of cultural change (Complaint by TelOne 
Regional Administration Officer, 2007)  
Does it mean trade unions are no longer tolerated in these state owned companies? The answer 
seems to be yes and for now the once militant CASWUZ has returned to its shell. But as Silver 
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argues, labour is never a spend force; we might very soon see the sleeping giant awakening 
again if the leaders adopt new organizing strategies. One disturbing thing about the 2004 strike 
is  the  lack  of  solidarity  from the  ZCTU  let  alone  the  MDC for  which  the  workers  were 
dismissed.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  GNU is  going  to  consider  the  plight  of  the 
dismissed workers or not as politicians have a tendency to use civic society on their way up the 
ladder only to abandon them when the struggle is won. It is heartening though that CASWUZ 
received solidarity messages from global unions such as Union Network International Africa 
(UNI Africa) and in a latter to the regional secretary the union was grateful for the moral and 
material  support during the NetOne strike.  In the same letter  the union advised UNI of the 
pending TelOne/ZimPost strike (CASWUZ Letter  to UNI Africa,  29 September 2004). The 
UNI affiliates send their solidarity messages most notably as they said they will continue to 
step up support for dismissed CASWUZ members (UNI Postal Global Bulletin, Issue No. 3, 
2004).
Conclusion
Stay-aways have been one of the strategies that CASWUZ adopted during the period 1994 to 
2004 as a way of minimizing injury to its members from the repressive state police. As the 
economic  crisis  worsened  in  Zimbabwe,  the  state  became  more  and  more  repressive  as 
reflected by the essential service labour legislation which made it illegal for communication 
sector workers to go on strike. Whereas CASWUZ adopted various tactics and adopted the stay 
away strategy for its own strikes, but on joint demonstrations with civil society they went to the 
streets.  The actions  of CASWUZ during the period under study reflect  that  it  was a social 




The  study  examined  how  CASWUZ’s  role  and  strategies  changed  during  the  strike  wave 
between 1994 and 2004 in the context of neoliberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) and consequent economic and political instability. The labour movement has had to play 
a leading role in advocating for workplace and political democracy. Regardless of this fact, few 
studies have been carried on the role of labour movements in fighting for wages and democracy 
and this study was carried out to fill in this gap. The study analyzed how the strikes by public 
sector unions in particular CASWUZ shaped its character.
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The study analysed these issues using in-depth interviews with trade union leaders and shop 
stewards  of  CASWUZ  in  an  attempt  to  get  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  unions’  shifting 
strategies. Documentary evidence was also used to illustrate the shifting strategy. 
The study found out that as the Zimbabwean crisis unfolded; the union shifted its strategy from 
being collaborative to adopting a confrontational stance, especially from 1994. This is reflected 
in the fact that they played a leading role in challenging the repressive state law of essential 
services which barred them from going on strike. Thus they were not passive victims of the new 
economic order as they responded with strike action. CASWUZ was the protagonist in terms of 
strike action both for wages and for democracy as they participated fully in these strikes. The 
study suggests that the key phase in Zimbabwean politics is the year or so between 1999 and 
2000 as labour, alongside other social movements, was instrumental in the formation of a new 
political  party  in  September  1999.  During  this  period,  relations  between  management  and 
workers started to shift due to shifting political  alliances with government,  with management 
becoming highly political. The politicization of the workplace affected labour relations as well 
because genuine bread and butter demands by workers were being misconstrued to be political 
hence  the  workplace  became a battle  field.  It  became difficult  to  win an increment  without 
resorting to job action. The labour – MDC alliance and the management – ZANU PF alliance 
made it difficult for CASWUZ to organize effectively given that the state had been syndically 
harsh and politically closed (trade union demands and political demands are not listened to by 
the state) in terms of Valenzuela’s (1989) framework for analysis. As such CASWUZ adopted 
the  stay  away strategy to  minimize  injury of  its  members  from repressive  state  police.  The 
strikers used what they coined the spider’s web which involved informal strike gatherings and 
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spread of strike messages by word of mouth or telephone. This strategy/tactic had weaknesses as 
it  removed  the  strike  action  from the  workplace  hence  the  risk  of  scab  labour  was  high  as 
evidenced by the 2004 strike.
After 1999 all state owned companies were staffed with ruling party sympathizers as argued by 
Saunders (2005) and Sachikonye (2009). The CASWUZ and workers also resisted government 
hegemony  and  followed  a  trajectory  of  institutionalized  autonomy  something  scholars  like 
Waterman,  Webster,  Pillay  and  others  have  called  social  movement  unionism.  The 
transformation  of  CASWUZ  into  a  social  movement  union  is  reflected  by  the  fact  that  it 
increased its demands to include other social factors and also its alliance with other global unions 
such as Union Network International (UNI). Links with political parties such as the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) has also been considered to be SMU by scholars such as Von 
Holdt (2002). 
The success of CASWUZ may be attributed to the fact  that starting in 1994 its strikes were 
driven from below. This accounted for the union’s strength until 2004 when divisions within the 
union leadership split the workers and gave management the opportunity to dismiss the workers 
who  had  gone  on  strike.  In  summary,  the  2004  strike  was  caused  by  divisions  within  the 
leadership as well as a lack of strategy by the new leadership following the 1999 restructuring of 
the PTC. Scab labour in the form of soldiers also attributed to the failure of the 2004 strike as 
most workers were scared by the sight of soldiers. 
In conclusion, CASWUZ transformed into a social movement union post 2000 mainly as a result 
of the 2000 salary despute as they broadened their  demands to include social  issues such as 
taxation,  access  to  free  anti  –  retroviral  drugs,  cash  shortages  and  the  adoption  of  a  new 
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constitution, all of which affect society. The union did not involve itself in the MDC in order to 
become political  but it  was a form a protest  against  the perceived arrogance of the state.  In 
dealing with workplace issues they would say we are not political and when confronting the state 
under ZCTU or other social movements, they would say we are protecting our constitutional 
rights. However, it  came out very clearly that public sector strikes are inherently political  in 
Zimbabwe  as  the  employer/state  would  frequently  use  the  strikes  to  discredit  the  union’s 
demands. In summary, CASWUZ responded to changes in the communications industry caused 
by ESAP through strike action. It managed to play a leading role in breaking the union alliance 
with the ZANUPF government  because of  the unity among workers and the leadership  that 
prevailed at the time. There are possibilities of revival if they adopt new sources of power such 
as logistical power.
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My name is Taurai Mereki and I am conducting this research for the purposes of obtaining a 
Masters Degree at the University of the Witwatersrand.
The focus of my research is on striking for wages and democracy by public sector unions using 
the Communications and Allied Services Workers Union of Zimbabwe (CASWUZ) as a case 
study.  It  is hoped that this  research will  help us better  understand the contribution made by 
CASWUZ in the fight for wages and democracy under conditions of economic instability and 
political uncertainty.
I therefore wish to invite you to participate in this study which will entail being interviewed by 
me. Your participation is entirely voluntary and refusal to participate will not be held against you 
in any way. If you agree to take part, I shall arrange an interview at a time and place suitable for 
you. The interview will take about 45 minutes and with your permission I would like to tape 
record the interview. You may refuse to answer any questions that you feel uncomfortable with 
answering and you may withdraw from the study at any time.
121
Please  be  assured that  your  personal  details  and responses  will  be kept  confidential  and  no 
information that could identify you will be included in the final report.
Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the study and I will try to answer them to the best 
of my ability. I may be contacted on my mobile number at +263 912 453 652 or alternatively you 
can contact my supervisor, Dr. Noor Nieftagodien on +27 11 717 4284.




I_____________________________________ hereby consent to participate in an interview for 
the research project conducted by Taurai Mereki. The purpose and procedures of the study have 
been explained to me.
I agree to have this interview taped [please tick one] Yes  No
I agree to have you use my real name [please tick one] Yes  No
Participant’s signature..………………………




CONSENT FORM FOR TAPE-RECORDING
I_____________________________________ hereby consent to the tape-recording of the 
interview. I understand that all information will be kept confidential and that the tapes will be 
kept in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed two years after publication of the final report.
Name of participant……………………………….
Signature…………………………………………..
Date……………………………………………….
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